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RECENT FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE PETROLEUM PIPE LINE AS A COMMON CARRIER
THEODORE L. WHITESEL

Jurisdiction Under the Interstate Commerce Act

Regulation of the interstate petroleum pipe line as a common carrier under
the Interstate Commerce Act has had as its major purpose the achievement
of competition among shippers in the petroleum industry It is the object
of this survey to examine the recent attempts at regulation to see if this
purpose has been achieved' and to set forth the legal and economic factors
entering into the problem of regulation.
The groups that favor petroleum pipe line regulation to maintain competition are the consumers of refined petroleum products, the independent
refiners of crude oil, the independent jobbers of refined petroleum products,
the independent service station dealers, the competitive carriers of petroleum,
lt might well be the objective of a study to appraise the economic merits of competitive organization of the oil industry as compared to monopolistic organization under
government control,-backgrounded against the national welfare and the national defense. Although theoretically the petroleum industry has been organized on a competitive
basis since the Standard Oil Trust was dissolved in 1911, actually it appears to be
monopolistically controlled by 20 major oil companies. A study made for the Temporary
National Economic Committee concludes that there is a high degree of cooperation
among the major companies, the effect being about the same as if one company were in
control of the industry. In 1938 the majors controlled about 70 per cent of the proven
crude oil reserves, produced about 52 per cent of the crude oil, refined 85 per cent of
the crude oil, owned 89 per cent of crude oil trunk pipe lines, 87 per cent of the oil
tankers, and 73 per cent of the bulk gasoline plants. Control of transportation facilities
enables them to control the crude oil markets, uniform prices being posted in the producing fields. The majors account for 85 per cent of the domestic sales of gasoline and
over 96 per cent of the gasoline pipe lines. The markets for gasoline are divided with
one major oil company exercising price leadership in a marketing territory. Basing
point price systems are used to stabilize prices. The majors jointly engage in gasoline
price cutting wars to drive independents out of a given territory. They generally place
the burden of retail price wars on service, station lessees, who operate company owned
stations on a commission basis and buy the gasoline from the majors at rigid tank
car prices. Losses suffered by the majors in their marketing divisions are more than
covered by high profits made in their pipe line divisions. See Temporary National
Economic Committee, Monograph No. 39, Control of the Petroleum Industry by Major
Oil Companies (1941). Nearly one billion dollars of new refining capacity-a 20 per,
cent increase in over-all refining capacity-was constructed during the war. Eighteen
majors own 70 per cent and operate 80 per cent of these new facilities. These privatelyowned facilities are now fully paid for out of wartime profits and contractual allowances, and are completely amortized. About 85 per cent of the investment was in refineries employing the catalytic cracking process, which makes possible the production
of a higher quality of gasoline at less cost than other refinery processes for regular
gasoline. The majors therefore have a more dominant position than before the war.
Economic Concentrationand World War II, Report of the Smaller War Plants Corporation, SEN. Doc. No. 206, 169, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
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and the independent crude oil producers. 2 On the other hand, the major
oil companies, which own almost all of the petroleum pipe lines,3 seek to
maintain their competitive advantage over the smaller independent refining
companies and oppose this regulation.
The function of the pipe line in the organization of the oil industry is
chiefly to serve the large oil companies 4 as an integral operation in the
transformati6n of a raw material into a finished product ready for the market.
It has been a highly successful adjunct of the large scale oil refineries in
reaching out to bring to the refinery an adequate supply of crude oil 5 and
to take to the markets the refined oil products. Conversely, the large oil
refineries are necessary to the economic existence of the trunk pipe lines.0
There are several reasons for this dependency. In the first place, the petroleum pipe lines are essentially one product, one way carriers. They require
a large investment of capital and the fixed charges on this investment make
necessary a large and steady volume of business to permit low unit costs.
Also, the large initial investment and the risk that attaches to the investment
because of shifting sources of supply and markets make the large corporate
enterprise engaged in the oil refining business especially suited to the undertaking of pipe line ventures. Furthermore, coordination of transportation
with the extraction, manufacturing, and marketing of oil by a unified business
7
management results in savings in operating costs.
In consideration of the economic interdependence of the large refineries
and the trunk pipe lines, it would appear impracticable to require the pipe
lines to serve shippers in the capacity of common carriers. This approach to
2
Petroleum Rail Shippers Association v. Alton and Southern R.R. et aL., 243 1. C. C.
5893 (1941).
Part 14-A, Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, 7723, 7729
(1939). On Jan. 1, 1938, 14 of the 20 major oil companies in the United States owned
89 per cent of all crude oil pipe line mileage on which reports to the Interstate Commerce Commission are given. On the same date, 17 major oil companies owned 96.1
per cent of the total gasoline pipe line mileage in the United States, as reported to the
National Economic Committee. See note 1 supra.
Temporary
4
Pogue, Economics of the Petroleum Industry. Part 14, Hearings before the Temporary
National Economic Committee, 7457, 7475 (1939).
5
The need for reaching out for oil is evidenced by the fact that of the crude oil
requirements of eastern refineries, 85 per cent comes from fields west of the Mississippi
River. Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I. C. C. 115, 119 (1940).
6To serve the refineries there were in existence in 1939 more than 112,000 miles of
trunk and gathering lines with a construction cost exceeding one billion dollars. Id.
at 7 120.
Pogue, Economics. of Conservation and Proration in. the Petroleum I-ndustry. Part
14, Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, 7438 (1939). BEARD,
REGULATION OF PIPE LINES AS CoMMoN CARRIERS (1941) 161. It appears that econo-

mies in the integration of transportation with manufacturing are more evident than in
the integration of extraction and marketing with manufacturing and transportation.
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regulation of the petroleum pipe lines has been taken by the Federal Government, but it has not achieved the intended result, since most of the pipe lines
serve only their shipper owners.8 It might be more appropriate to regulate
the oil industry as a whole, pipe lines being considered as one phase of the
business of supplying markets with petroleum products. In the regulation
of water and artificial gas companies, the pipe line is considered an integral
part of the business of supplying utilities.9 Under the Natural Gas Act,10
the Federal Government regulates the transmission and sale at wholesale
of natural gas in interstate commerce separately from the production and
gathering of gas, which are left to state regulation. This separation in control, however, is due more to legal barriers' which have prevented the
states from adequately regulating the interstate operations of the natural
gas companies than to differentiation as to economic functions. The natural
gas pipe lines are regulated under Federal law as parts of vertical utilities
and not as public transportation agencies, as are the oil pipe lines. Furthermore, the greatest conservation of oil and capital resources would seem to
result from a comprehensive regulation of the whole oil industry.' 2 According to Professor Thompson, the enlargement of interstate commerce powers
by recent Supreme Court decisions has cleared the way for the Federal
Government to step in and regulate the entire oil industry in the interest of
conservation, and the failure of two important oil producing states to join
the Interstate -Oil Compact plan' 3 for conserving oil resources presents an
80f 37 pipe lines answering a questionnaire of the Interstate Commerce Commission,

10 served none but their oil company owners, 20 served one to six non-affiliated shippers, and seven served from 10 to -37 such shippers. Reduced Pipe Line Rates and
Gathering Charges, 243 I. C. C. 115, 121 (1940). Also, a study made by the Independent
Petroleum Association of America showed that 10 major companies averaged transporting for companies having no interest in the pipe line only-8.73 per cent of the total
oil transported. Temporary National Ecowmic Committee, Monograph No. 39, Control
of the Petroleum Industry by Major Oil Companies, 23 (1941). The questionnaire of
the Temporary National Economic Comuiittee to major oil companies requesting information as to the extent to which their pipe lines transported petroleum for others
than the owners indicated that probably less than 10 per cent of the crude oil and a
very small per cent of the gasoline was carried for others. This small quantity moved
for others was mostly for other major oil companies. Part 14-A, Hearings before the
Temporary National Economic Committee, 7724, 7728 (1939).
DBEARD, loc. cit. supra note 7.
1052 STAT. 821 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 717 (1940).
"Note
(1942) 27 CoRxEI
L. Q. 399.
12 Conservation of oil may be defined as the avoidance of waste in its recovery or use.
The amount of refined petroleum products recovered depends upon the process of
refining and varies with the type of refinery. The importance of conserving capital
in the petroleum industry is evidenced by an estimated capital investment of 15 billions
of dollars at the end of 1939, an amount exceeded only by the investment in agriculture,
railroads, and public utilities. See Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph No. 39, Control of the Petroleum Industry by Major Oil Companies, 1 (1941).
'5 The Interstate Oil Compact plan of conservation is one of controlling the production
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excfuse for doing so.14 In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in
Nebbia v. New York," in which state regulation of the milk industry as to
prices was held not to deprive a person of his property without due process
of law, regulation of the entire oil industry in the public interest would
surely be held to be constitutional. The recent experience of the nation's
being caught in a war emergency without adequate oil transportation facilities, requiring the construction of the "Big Inch" pipe line of twenty-four
inch diameter and the "Little Big Inch" pipe line of twenty inchdiameter
to solve this problem, is additional reason for looking at pipe line transportation as part of a national problem of insuring an adequate supply of petroleum
at all times.' 6 Any regulatory action taken towards the pipe line as a comof crude oil according to market demand: State administrative agencies are established
by state laws to prorate permitted production among producing units. An Interstate
Oil Compact Commission coordinates the state programs but has no authority over
production in any state. Because some states have no -proration laws, the major oil
companies can obtain crude oil from their holdings in these states to make up for restrictions in output from their wells in the states that have proration laws. Independent
refiners with sources of oil only in states that have proration programs, such as the state
of Texas, can get crude oil only in quantities sufficient to operate their plants at partial
capacity. With fixed costs constituting a high proportion of total costs, their unit costs
of production are high and they are at a disadvantage in competing with the majors.
See Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph No. 39, Control of the
Petroleum Industry by Major Oil Companies, 14 (1941). Also, Part 14, Hearingsbefore
the Temporary National Ecoiwmic Committee, 7135, 7600, 7620 (1939). The Terfiporary
National Economic Cpmmittee questionnaire to oil companies showed that in 1926 the
major companies operated their refineries at 81 per cent of capacity while "all other"
companies operated at 62 per cent and that in 1937 the major companies operated at
85 per cent of capacity compared with only 49 per cent by "all other" companies. Part
14-A,
Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, 7735 (1939).
14 Thompson, Recent Steps in Government Regulation of Business (1942) 28 CORNELL
L. Q. 1, 13.
15291
U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 89 A. L. R. 1469, 1495 (1934).
16 Government Owned Pipe Lines, Report of the Surplus Property Administration to
the Congress, (January 4, 1946) 6.
The "Big Inch" project consists of a main line extending from Longview, Texas, in
the East Texas Oil Field, to the New York-Philadelphia refinery area; a feeder system
in the Longview area; connections with industry lines serving the West Texas and
Southwest Texas oil fields; and an intermediate terminal at Norris City, Illinois. It is
1,340 miles long and cost $78,500,000. It started operations July, 1943, having been
constructed in 350 days. Up to August 31, 1945, Big Inch had moved 260,700,000 barrels
of crude oil.
The "Little Big Inch" originates at Beaumont, Texas, in the Texas Gulf Coast refinery area and extends for 1,475 miles to the New York area. From Little Rock,
Arkansas, it is laid on the same right-of-way and parallels the Big-Inch line. It also
has an intermediate terminal at Norris City, Illinois, including extensive storage facilities. It was built in 225 days and cost $67,300,000. It began delivering gasoline in
March, 1944, and during its period of operation it transported approximately 107,000,000
barrels of petroleum products. This description is from WORLD PETROLEUM (June, 1945)
which adds that the two pipe lines saved the people of the United States sufficient
amounts when compared with railroad rates to pay the entire cost of building and
operating the systems.
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mon carrier should recognize the importance to the nation of the pipe line
as a low cost means of transportation and as a quick and dependable means
of supplying a vital product to the armed forces in event of war.
The petroleum pipe lines were placed in the category of common carriers
by the Hepburn Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1906 for
the purpose of regulating rates and service.' 7 The extension of the regulatory
powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission to include pipe lines had
the immediate objective of eliminating the monopoly power of the Standard
Oil Company in the petroleum industry.' 8 The Hepburn Act also brought
pipe lines under the scope of the Elkins Act, making it a misdemeanor to
give or to receive rebates or to depart from published rates by any device
whatsoever.' 9 The purpose of this action was to prevent preferences that
obstructed competition. Although the petroleum pipe lines have been regulated by Congress with the broad objective of promoting competition in the
oil industry, the method taken has been to regulate this phase of the industry
20
as a public utility, the modern concept of which is controlled monopoly.
The constitutionality of the Hepburn Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act as applied to interstate petroleum pipe lines was sustained by the
United States Supreme Court in 1914.21 The Court first considered application of the Act to the pipe lines owned by the Standard Oil Company,
which through monopoly power compelled producers to sell to them their
oil before it was transported over the pipe lines. Since these pipe lines were
common carriers in substance, it was held to be within the due process of
law clause of the Fifth Amendment to require them by statute to be common
carriers in form.22 However, the Uncle Sam Oil Company, in transporting
oil by pipe line from its own wells in Oklahoma to its refinery in Kansas,
was considered not to be engaged in transportation within the meaning of
the act, "the transportation being merely an incident to use at the end".2
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, said that the same fact that determines
"transportation" under the Act also determines "commerce", that is, the fact
of "beginning in purchase and ending in sale". 24 The Uncle Sam Company
decision constitutes an exception to the application of the Act "to any corpo1741 STAT.

474 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (1) (1940).

182 SHARrMAN, THE INTERSTATE CO.MEmcE CommissioN (1931) 59, 96.
1934 STAT. 587 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 41 (1940).
20
Note (1920) 33 HARv. L. REv. 576. The author of this note points out that

modern
public utility regulation possesses the dual aspect of regulated monopoly and regulated
competition.
21
22The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 956 (1914).
1d. at 561, 34 Sup. Ct. at 959.
23
1d. at 562, 34 Sup. Ct. at 959.
24
1d. at 560, 34 Sup. Ct. at 958.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 32

ration or any person or persons engaged in the transportation of oil . ..
by means of pipe lines".In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice White disagreed with the Court's
ruling that the Uncle Sam Oil Company was not engaged in transportation
in interstate commerce 20 He concurred in the Uncle Scm Oil Corpcmy decision for the reason that he believed the statute unconstitutional as a violation
of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, if applied to this company.
The interpretation given by Holmes to "commerce" under the statute as
involving transactions of purchase and sale is more limited than that made
by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. OgdenY In his opinion in that case,
Justice Marshall included every species of intercourse between states as
commerce, irrespective of buying and selling. Since Justice Marshall's famous
decision, the Supreme Court has ruled in a number of cases that activities
carried on across state lines constituted interstate commerce, although they
involved no transactions of purchase and sale.2 In a recent decision2 upholding the Federal power to regulate fire insurance contracts of companies
carrying on interstate business, the Supreme Court has taken a broad view
of interstate commerce, "Not only ...

may transactions be commerce though

non-commercial; they may be commerce though illegal and sporadic, and
though they do not utilize common carriers or concern the flow of anything
more tangible than electrons and information". (Italics added.) 30
Since the decision in The Pipe Line Cases, there have been two decisions
of the Supreme Court as to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission over petroleum pipe lines.81 In the Valvoline case, the Valvoline
Oil Company had sought to enjoin and annul an order of the Interstate
25d.

at 557, 34 Sup. Ct. at 957; 34 STAT. 584 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (1) (1940).

26d. at 562, 34 Sup. Ct. at 959.

279 Wheat. 1 (U. S.1824). See CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES
RIGHTS
(1936) 6.
28
Railroad Company v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 470 (1877), where the driving or conveying of cattle across state lines was held to be interstate commerce; Covington and
C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S.204, 218, 14 Sup. Ct. 1087, 1092 (1894), holding
the activity of people passing and repassing over a bridge between two states to be
interstate commerce; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S.161, 177, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 281
(1908) ; International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S.91, 107, 30 Sup. Ct. 481, 485
(1910), in which teaching by correspondence through the mails was held to be interstate
commerce.
29
n referring to Marshall's interpretation of interstate commerce, the Court said,
"No decision of this Court has ever questioned this as too comprehensive a description
of the subject matter of the Commerce clause." 'United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association et al., 322 U. S.533, 557, 64 Sup. Ct. 1162, 1178 (1944).
3Old. at 549,- 64 Sup. Ct. at 1171.
SlValvoline Oil Co. v. United States, 308 U. S.141, 60 Sup. Ct. 160 (1939). Champlin
Refining Co. v. United States et at., - U. S. -, 67 Sup. Ct. 1 (1946). This case was
appealed from Federal District Court, 59 F. Supp. 978 (W. D. Okla. 1945).
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Commerce Commission requiring it to file certain maps, charts and schedules
of its pipe line properties for valuation purposes on the ground that it was
32
not a common carrier pipe line subject to jurisdiction of the Commission.
The issue was whether or not the company's pipe line that was gathering
oil from 9,020 wells in Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Ohio and transporting it across state lines to the company's two refineries in Pennsylvania
was a private pipe line and not intended to be regulated by the Hepburn
Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act. The Court distinguished the
Valvoline Company pipe line from the Uncle Sam Oil Company pipe line
on the ground that the oil was not obtained from the wells of the ownershipper but from the wells of many producers and held the company
subject to regulation by the Commission. By implication, the Court left
intact the Uncle Sam Company principle that a purely private pipe lihe is
excepted from the Act.
This approval of the Uncle Sam Company ruling seems inconsistent with
the Court's interpretation, in the same opinion, of the wording of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920.P After
reviewing the legislative history of this Amendment as applied to pipe lines,
the Court interpreted the term "common carrier" to apply to all pipe line
companies and not to be modified by a subsequent clause referring to "common carriers for hire".3 4
There was considered the further question of whether or not the Valvoline
Company was engaged in interstate commerce, since it only bought oil and
did not sell it. The company sold surplus oil to other refineries but it was
careful to include as surplus oil only that bought within the same state as
the refinery to which it was sold. The Court did not discuss the question
but simply concluded that there was no doubt about its being engaged in
interstate commerce.3 5 The essence of the case was the existence of a monopoly situation that needed public regulation.3 6" By means of its extensive
82The Valvoline Company p ipe line was held by the Interstate Commerce Commission
to be a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce and subject to the Interstate
Commerce Act. Petition of the Valvoline Co. in the Matter of the Valuation of Its
Pipe Lines, 47 Val. Rep. 534 (1937) and 48 Val. Rep. 10 (1938).
3341 STAT. 474 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (1940).
84Valvoline Oil Co. v. United States, 308 U. S. 141, 146, 60 Sup. Ct. 160, 162 (1939).
See note 79 infra.
351d.
at 144, 60 Sup. Ct. at 161.
36
"The practice of compelling producers to sell at the well before admitting their oil
to the lines was widely used as a means of monopolizing the product before the Hepburn
Amendment in 1906. Whether the oil so owned and transported was ultimately used
by the carrier in its own operations or sold to others was in this connection immaterial.
Certainly one would find a public interest in the sole means of transporting the commodity from thousands of wells for thousands of producers. This was covered by the
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system of gathering lines, the Valvoline Company was in a position to control the price of crude oil at the wells unless it was required by regulation
to permit local producers to use its trunk pipe line as a common carrier.
Thus, in holding Valvoline subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Court was consistent with the purpose of the
Hepburn Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act as applied to petroleum pipe lines to enforce competition in the petroleum industry. But in
approving the Uncle Sam Company ruling, the Court was inconsistent with
its interpretation of the wording of the Adt and the evident intent of Con-

3
gress in passing the Act.

7

The recent Champlin Refining Company case also involved the pipe line
as an instrument of monopoly power. In June, 1944, Champlin brought suit
in a Federal District Court to enjoin the enforcement of the order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission to file with the Commission information
for use in the valuation of the company's gasoline pipe line properties. The
Commission had ruled that the pipe line of Champlin was a common carrier
subject to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. 38 The Federal
District Court upheld the Commission's ruling.3 9 The case was appealed
by Champlin to the United States Supreme Court. A decision of the Supreme
Court, November 18, 1946, 40upheld the ruling of the Commission and the
decree of the District Court.
Pipe Lihe decision." Id. at 144-5, 60 Sup. Ct. at 162. The company contended that it
had no monopoly over the outlet for the oil produced. However, according to testimony
taken by the Interstate Commerce Commission, in the event the Valvoline Co. should
refuse to accept the oil, the producers could receive service from other pipe lines serving
as common carriers only-if they were able to tender at least five barrels of oil 'per day
per mile of pipe line extension necessary to make the connection. The average run of
oil from all the wells served by the Valvoline Co. was but a little over a barrel per
day per mile of pipe line extension, so this requirement operated to deprive these producers of another pipe line outlet for their oil. Petition of the Valvoline Oil Company
in the Matter of the Valuation of Its Pipe Lines, 48 Val. Rep. 10, 12 (1938). The
Interstate Commerce Commission did not contend that the Valvoline Company had
a monopoly over the outlet of oil but that the pipe line was properly subject to regulation
because of the widespread public interest in the Company's operations. Id. at 15.
372 SARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1931) 97, n. 185. "While
"some doubt was expressed as to the constitutional validity of embracing all pipe lines
in interstate commerce, there was complete agreement in the legislative debate that this
was the intent of the amendment." Id. at 101, n. 200. See also In the Matter of
Pipe Lines, 24 I. C. C. 1, 4-6 (1912), where the Interstate Commerce Commission held
all pipe lines subject to its jurisdiction; Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. United States, 204
Fed. 798 (1913), where the Commerce Court held the Hepburn Act unconstitutional as
to 3pipe
lines.
8
Champlin Refining Co., Valuation of Pipe Line, 49 Val. Rep. 463, 467 (1942), id.
at 542, 548 (1944).
9
D. Okla. 1945).
430 Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 978 -(W.
Champlin Refining Co. v. United States et al.32a:U. S#--, 67 Sup. Ct. 1 (1946).
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The pipe line in question was used for transporting gasoline from the
refinery of the Champlin Refining Company at Enid, Oklahoma, to terminal
points at Hutchinson, Kansas, Superior, Nebraska, and Rock Rapids, Iowa.41The line is of six inch pipe, 516 miles in length, lying in five states. Deliveries were made by means of truck or railroad tank car from storage tanks
at the terminal points to the bulk plants 42 of jobbers and to 248 company
owned bulk plants, which served 316 company-owned retail service stations
and other local dealers. Champlin carried only gasoline that it owned; it
had never held itself out nor been asked to serve as a carrier for others;
there were no facilities for putting any petroleum products into the line
other than at the Enid refinery.
On the basis of these facts, Champlin contended that it was operating as
a private carrier and consequently was not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce Commission.4 3 No tariff stating transportation charges
had been filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission or other regulatory
body. The Interstate Commerce Commission claimed jurisdiction on the
ground that pipe line companies transporting oil from one state to another
were aeclared common carriers by the Interstate Commerce Act. 44 On the
theory that Champlin was engaged in transportation for the public in carrying
gasoline to market, the Commission considered the interpretations of the
Act by the Supreme Court in The Pipe Line Cases and the Valvoline case
applicable to it.4 5 On the other hand, Champlin contended that its operations
were unlike those of the Standard Oil Company and the Valvoline Oil
Company, because it was not purchasing oil from the public before carrying
Refining Co., Valuation of Pipe Line, 49 Val. Rep. 463, 464 (1942).
A bulk plant is a storage station, consisting of one or more tanks and a loading
rack,
and usually a warehouse, located within trucking distance of the retail outlets.
43
The pipe line had been constructed by the Cimarron Valley Pipe Line Company, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Champlin chartered as a common carrier and possessing the
power of emineut domain, but it had been sold to Champlin before operations began so
that Champlin could operate it as a private products line separate from the common
carrier properties. Condemnation suits in connection with acquisition of a right of way
had been instituted but were dismissed and satisfactory settlements made with the land
owners. Champlin Refining Co., Valuation of Pipe Line, 49 Val. Rep. 463, 465 (1942).
Although the power of eminent domain had not been exercised, undoubtedly its
possession by Champlin facilitated the settlements with the contesting land owners.
The Supreme Court has ruled that the exercise of the right of eminent domain by a
pipe line company is to be taken as one indication of common carrier status. Producers
Transportation Co. v. R. R. Comm., 251 U. S. 228, 231, 40 Sup. Ct. 131, 133 (1920).
Where common carrier benefits are realized through possession of a privilege, regulation would seem to bd justified' zfs fully as when the benefits are received directly
through
exercise of the privilege.
44
Champlin Refining Co., Valuation of Pipe Line, 49 Val. Rep. 542, 545 (1944).
45
1d. at 548.
41Champlin
42
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it but was operating its pipe line as a plant facility in connection with its
46
refining operations.
Pricing policies of Champlin were taken by the Commission as indicative
that the pipe line was operated actually, although not technically, as a common carrier for hire, as were the pipe lines of Standard and Valvoline. 47
Gasoline was sold to jobbers at the terminal points at prices determined by
taking the spot, or f.o.b. price of gasoline at Enid and adding a differential
equal to the through railroad rates from Enid to the final destination and
subtracting the charges borne by the purchaser for the short haul transportation from the -pipe line terminal to the purchaser's place of business.
Departures from the prices arrived at by this formula were made when
necessary to meet competition. 48 The effect of these transactions upon jobbers was the same as if they had bought the gasoline at the refinery and had
transported it by rail common carrier to the destination. In sustaining the
valuation order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the District Court
employed reasoning similar to that of Justice Holmes in The Pipe Line Cases
and stated,

".

.

. the effect on the public is the same as if title passed to

the purchaser at the refinery. The purpose of the broad coverage of the
Act was to make it impossible for pipe line carriers to escape its terms
upon such technicalities." 49
In the opinion rendered by Justice Jackson, the Supreme Court did not
set forth the operations' of Champlin as tantamount to those of a common
carrier, as did the Interstate Commerce Commission and the District Court.
However, the Court ruled "that Champlin's operation is transportation within
the meaning of the Act and that the statute supports the Commission's order
to furnish information," 50 since "the controlling fact under the statute is
transporting comniodities from state to state by pipe line." 51 Because Champlin was operating "to put its finished product in the market in interstate
commerce at the greatest economic advantage" 52 and was pricing its product
so as to include a separate charge equal to rail freight rates to cover its
transportation by pipe line,53 the Court considered the operations of Champlin
significantly different from those of the Uncle Sam Oil Company.
4476Id. at 545.
1d. at 543 and 548.
4
SChamplin Refining Co., Valuation of Pipe Line, 49 Val. Rep. 463, 466 (1942);

see49 notes 75 and 77 infra.
5

Chanplin Refining Co. v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 978 981 (W. D. Okla. 1945).
oChamplin Refining Co. v. United States et a13 -- U. S. , 67 Sup. Ct. 1, 3 (1946).

52Ibid.
52Ibid.
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While differentiating the operations of Champlin from those of the Uncle
Sam Oil Company, the Court was not willing to say that Champlin could
be held to the obligations of a "conventional common carrier" under the
. 4
ActY
This question "is too premature and hypothetical to warrant consideration on this record." 55 It was considered that Congress had the constitutional power under the interstate commerce clause to authorize the Commission to require either a private carrier or a common carrier to furnish
"information as to facilities being used in interstate marketing of its product."' 5 6 Consequently, the Court did not find it necessary to rule on whether

Champlin was a common carrier for all purposes under the Act. Thus, the
ruling of the Court is that Champlin may be classified as a common carrier
for the purposes of obtaining information to value its pipe line properties,
and that it may or may not be so classified for other purposes. In a dissenting
opinion, a minority of four justices took the view that Champlin was not
a common carrier under the Act,57 and that to subject it to the Act for'purposes of valuation was to subject it to other requirements of the Act, such
as to "provide equal and reasonable transportation to all carriers" and to
"file a schedule of rates."5 8 In a petition for a rehearing of the case before
the Supreme Court, Champlin objects to the ruling of the Court on the
ground that it is an erroneous interpretation of Section 19a of the Act, which
requires the Commission to "investigate, ascertain, and report the value of
all the property owned or used by every common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter,"59 the words "this chapter" being considered to
include the entire Interstate Commerce Act. 60 Champlin complains that the
Court is directing it to do an impossible thing, "viz., retain our status as a
private carrier, .

. . ,

and at the same time file a 'common carrier' valuation

report and adopt the common carrier System of Uniform Accounts as prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission."' 61 The Court does not require Champlin to remain a private carrier. Champlin is simply not required
to be a common carrier. The argument advanced by the Court minority and
reiterated by Champlin in its petition for a rehearing of the case that a pipe
line must be held to be a common carrier before it can be required to submit
4Id. at 4.
55Ibid.
6
5O
bid.
57M. at 6.
5S8bid.

701 (1913), 49 U. S. C. § 19a (1940) ; see note 115, infra.
oPetition of Appellant for Rehearing, p. 23, 24, Champlin Refining Co. v. United

5937 STAT.
6

States et ao4q/U. S.-T, 67 Sup. Ct. 1 (1946).
61ld. at 3.
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information for its valuation as a common carrier seems valid. In sidestepping the fundarfiental question of whether gasoline pipe lines carrying
gasoline for their owners to distant markets can be regulated as common
carriers to achieve competition among shippers in the petroleum industry,
the Court seems not to have met the legal and economic issues presented by
the case.
In holding that Champlin is not a proper subject of regulation under the
Interstate Commerce Act the opinion of the Supreme Court minority does
not recognize the economic realities of the case. It found no important difference in Champlin's operations and those of the Uncle Sam Oil Company.
"Each carries its own oil for the same ultimate purpose-to reach the
market." 62 How much was charged by Champlin for its gasoline and how
the charge was calculated were considered to have no bearing upon the
question of whether or not Champlin was a common carrier. "Naturally some
transportation cost must be added to the refinery price for deliveries elsewhere." 63 These words indicate a willingness to sacrifice fact to form. In
charging prices equal to the costs to competitors of getting gasoline into
the markets by an inferior means of transportation Champlin demonstrates
the ability to command in the market the buying of its gasoline shipped by
pipe line. But the Court minority finds no intent to counteract such power
over markets for gasoline since "the evil sought to be remedied was the
mastery of oil through control of the gathering facilities"64 at the time the
Hepburn Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act was passed. Also,
in its petition for a rehearing of its case before the Supreme Court,65
62

Champlin Refining Co. v. United States et al., at 6.

63
1d.
64

65

1d. at 5.

U. S. -, 67 Sup. Ct. 1, 5 (1946).

The petition of Champlin Refining Co. for a rehearing rests principally upon (a) the
analogy to the Uitcle Sam Oil Co. case, (b) that interstate commerce in this transportation ends when the gasoline comes to rest in storage tanks at terminal points, (c)
that there is no public interest in the interstate transmission, as the transactions with
the public take place after the interstate commerce has thus ended, and finally (d) that
the movement of the gasoline here is like the railroad carrying coal for the coal company
from its mine in Pennsylvania to its processing plant in Ohio, whereby the subsequent
carriage of the coal to market in Ohio was held not to come under the Interstate
Commerce Act. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Utilities Comm. of Ohio, 298 U. S. 170,
56 Sup. Ct. 687 (1936).
Since jurisdiction over petroleum pipe lines seems to depend upon dealing with the
public in interstate commerce, continuity of movement would be a matter of importance
in determining whether interstate operations in petroleum are of such a character as
to bring pipe lines under the Interstate Commerce Act. In that connection it may be
observed that many of the sales and deliveries in the Champlin. case were pursuant to
yearly contracts or were spot sales on arrival of the product at the terminals, and
terminal storage was merely to facilitate" delivery to customers hence directly related
to transactions with the public in interstate commerce. On the other hand, in both the
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Champlin gives considerable emphasis to the similar argument that Congress
could not have intended to regulate gasoline pipe lines, because gasoline
pipe lines were not in use at that time and were first used to transport gasoline from refinery to market in 1930. To accept this line of reasoning is
to preclude that flexibility in the administration of a public utility law needed
to meet changing economic conditions and to deny the evident foresight of
the law makers in inserting the words "or other commodity" in the paragraph describing the pipe line uses subject to the Act.
Economic reality compels the conclusion that the operations of Champlin
affected the public in the same way as the operations of the Standard Oil
Company and the Valvoline Oil Company. Standard and Valvoline could
set the prices for crude oil in the fields and could compel producers to sell
oil to them at those prices, because they had control of the only effective
means of transportation. Consequently, the Supreme Court ruled that these
pipe lines were in substance common carriers. 66 Similarly, control of the
only effective means of transporting gasoline into certain areas gave to
Champlin the power to control the price of gasoline in markets and to compel
the public to deal with it. Although rail transportation was available, it did
not present to jobbers an effective means of getting gasoline. The cost of
67
shipping gasoline by rail is more than twice that of shipping by pipe line.
This difference in cost afforded to Champlin the ability to cut its wholesale
and retail prices for gasoline so as to reduce greatly, if not to eliminate, in
certain areas the competition of non-integrated refiners, who shipped in gasoline by rail and truck. Jobbers and dealers in gasoline were as much compelled to buy from Champlin as producers were to sell to Standard and
Valvoline. Champlin endeavored to keep its prices at a maximum, which
Uncle Sam case and the Pennsylvania Railroad case the continuity of movement of
the oil and the coal was broken by a processing stage before there were sales to the
public,
hence analogy to the operations of the Champlin Co. here is lacking.
60
The -Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 561, 34 Sup. Ct. 956, 959 (1914) ; Valvoline
Oil Company v. United States, 308 U. S. 141, 145, 60 Sup. Ct. 160, 162 (1939). Where
an oil company bought only a small part of the crude oil produced in fields tributary
to the pipe line which it operates and there was competition in the purchase of this
oil with a number of other oil pipe lines, the Supreme Court of California held the
pipe line not to be a common carrier or engaged in transporting oil for the public.
Associated Pipe Line Co. v. Railroad Commission, 176 Cal. 518, 169 Pac. 62, L. R. A.
1918C,
849, 855 (1917).
67
Pogue, Economics of tie Petroleum Industry. Part 14, Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, 7457 (1939). "Comparative costs per ton-mile are
approximately 8.3 mills by rail, 3.2 mills by pipe line, and 1.25 mills by tank vessel."
Id. at 7476. Because "the average cost of pipe line transportation probably does not
exceed 4 mills per ton-mile, which contrasts with an average cost of movement by rail
of approximately 8 mills per ton-mile," Mr. Pogue concludes that "no natural competition can persist between oil pipe lines and the railroads." Id. at 7474.
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was approximately what it cost jobbers to obtain gasoline from'non-integrated
Oklahoma refiners by rail, but it lowered prices when necessary and to the
extent necessary to get business. A competitive market depends upon the
presence of a large number of sellers operatiig under similar cost conditions.
Only then can buyers force a seller to price his products in close proximity
to his costs. 68 The large amount of capital required to build pipe lines prevents their employment by small refining companies. 9 These companies
might conceivably have competed with Champlin on the basis of refinery
costs, 70 but they could compete on the basis of transportation cost only if
Champlin were required to make its pipe line facilities available to them at
reasonable rates.
That Champlin succeeded by means of its pipe line in obtaining considerable monopoly power -in markets over a vast area is indicated by statements
in Champlin's brief before the Supreme Court. 71 After the construction of
its pipe line in 1935, it was able'to increase its business from a very low
volume to a point where, during the first six months of 1941, its sales in
the states of Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Minnesota, and South
Dakota amounted to 3.5 per cent of the whole business of the petroleum
industry in these states. In obtaining this volume of business, Champlin
charged prices based on competitors' prices at the jobbers' places of business,
which were necessarily high enough to compensate for rail freight rates.
That its proportion of the total business was a large amount for one company
is indicated by the fact that Champlin was one of the eight or nine largest
6SCLAR_,
9

SOCIAL CONTROL

OF

BUSINESS (1939)

126, 136, 139.

6 The total investment in Champlin's pipe line and appurtenant facilities was
$3,189,028. Champlin Refining Co., Valuation of Pipe Line, 49 Val. Rep. 463, 464 (1942).
The total investment in gasoline pipe lines by the end of 1938 was $44,000,000. This
represents ownership by 17 major oil companies and Champlin. The largest gasoline
pipe line investment was-that of the Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., $17,966,709. This
pipe line was jointly owned by 8 major oil companies. See Part 14-A, Hearings Before
the Temporary National Economic Committee, 7728, 7729 (1939). Testimony taken by

that Committee indicates that ownership of trunk pipe lines is within the reach of the
ordina ry independent operator only if he ppols his resources with other operators.

Digest of Petroleum Industry Hearings before Temporary National Economic Com-

mittee,
0

AmERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, 40 (1942).

" According to Pogue, small refineries can be constructed with the same physical
efficiency as large ones, but "the natural economic advantage of large-scale operations
in areas tributary to concentrated markets has tended to develop refining on a massproduction basis." Thus, it appears that the chief need of the small independent refiner
is to attain an efficient means of reaching the markets. In 1938, there were 104 refinery
plants with 78.7 per cent of the operating capacity of the country and 327 plants with
21.3 per cent of the capacity. Part 14, Hearings before the Temporary National Eco-

nomic Committee, 7457 (1939).
71Brief for Appellant, -p. 5, Champlin Refining Co. v. United States et al., 66 Sup. Ct. 88, 173 (1945).

U. S.

-,
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suppliers of gasoline in these six states, and the principle major oil company doing business in these states in 1938 did only 16.5 per cent of
the total business in that year.72 Also, the percentage of business done by
Champlin throughout the six states does not demonstrate its greater competitive advantage in more limited market areas near its pipe line terminals
within those states. Trade connections established by Champlin throughout this area before 1935 help account for its great increase in business."3
Some of the increase may be explained as the regaining of former business
lost to major oil companies that had extended into these states gasoline
pipe lines and 'crude oil pipe lines to serve refineries newly located there. 4
But the major oil companies were favorably situated to retain their
business because .of their pipe lines and strategic refinery locations. They
had the same policy as Champlin of basing prices on refinery prices and
adding freight charges from Group Three (Oklahoma, generally from
Tulsa) f These uniform price policies might be the result of the operation
of the principle of monopolistic competition that where only a few large
sellers are operating in a market each seller tends to determine his price
policy according to what he believes the effect will be upon rival sellers. 6
Again, this might be the result of collusive agreements among the large
sellers. 77 The absence of price competition among the major sellers leads
72 The Standard Oil Co. of Indiana was the principal major oil company operating in
these six states in 1938. Of a total consumption of 50,326,381 barrels of gasoline in these
states in 1938 it sold 8,303,815 barrels, or 16.5 per cent. The Stanolind Pipe Line Co.,
owned by Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, runs a trunk crude oil pipe line from Wyoming
east across Nebraska and Kansas to near Kansas City, where it is connected to a trunk
crude oil pipe line running from Oklahoma to Kansas City and to Chicago. See Minnelusa Oil Corp. et at. v. Continental Pipe Line Co. et a[., loc. cit. infra note 161.
Computations made from data in Part 14-A, Hearings before the Temporary National
Ecoiomic Committee, Tables 38a and 38b, 7814-7817 (1939), show that other major oil
companies, operating in these states, ranked in order of gasoline sold in 1938, were:
Phillips Petroleum Co., 9.8%; Consolidated Oil Corp., 7.5%; Socony Vacuum Co., 7%;
Texas Corp., 6.4%; Skelly, 6%; Continental Oil Co., 5.6%; Shell Union Oil Corp.,
3.9%;
Cities Service, 2.7%.
73 Champlin Refining Co., Valuation of Pipe Line, 49 Val. Rep. 463, 464 (1942).
74Ibid.
75 Both Champlin and the major oil companies used basing point price systems, determining their prices in the markets according to the spot market price of gasoline at
Tulsa, Oklahoma,, as shown in the Chicago Journal of Commerce, plus freight charges
from Oklahoma to destination. See Champlin Refining Co., Valuation of Pipe Line,
49 Val. Rep. 463, 466 (1942); Part 14-A, Hearings before the Temporary National
Economic Committee, Appendix VI (1939); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co.,
Inc., et al., 310 U. S. 150, 192, 194, 60 Sup. Ct. 811, 830, 831 (1940) ; see note 77 infra.
76CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BusiNEss (1939)
134; CHAmBERLA N, THE THEORY
or MONoPOLIsTIc Comi'TrrrioN (1946) 46-50.
77In the Madison Oil case, fourteen major oil companies were indicted and convicted

of engaging in collusive agreements, in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, to
establish uniform tank car prices of gasoline to jobbers in the Middle West. United

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 32

to the conclusion that Champlin increased its business at the expense of the
small, independent refiners who shipped gasoline from Oklahoma by rail
and truck. Thus, it appears evident that Champlin had considerable monopoly
power in markets covering a vast area and was operating, in substance, if
not in form, as a common carrier, as were Standard and Valvoline.
Irrespective of the fact that Champlin used its pipe line to serve the public
directly and the Uncle Sam Oil Company did not, the wording of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended by the Transportation Act of 1920 defining

the term "common carrier" to "include all pipe line companies" 78 is sufficient
basis for bringing both Champlin and a company operating as did the Uncle
Sam Oil Company under the Act. In both the Valvoline and the Champlin
cases, the Supreme Court interpreted the words of the Act to bring all interstate pipe lines under the jurisdiction of the Commission. 79 Yet, in both
cases the Court deliberated the proposition of the appellants that the pipe
line in question did not come under the Act because it was in the category
States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., et al., 23 F. Supp. 937 (W. D. Wis. 1938). These
convictions were upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Socony Vacuum
Oil Co., Inc., et al., 310 U. S. 150, 60 Sup. Ct. 811 (1940). The method taken to control
prices to jobbers in the Middle West was to control the Mid-Continent spot market prices
for gasoline through an informal gentlemen's agreement among the majors to buy the
distress gasoline of about 17 independent refiners in the Mid-Continent area,-gasoline for
which these refiners had no regular outlets and insufficient storage capacity and which,
therefore, had to be sold for whatever price it would bring. Standard Oil Company
(Indiana) was known as the price leader throughout the Midwestern area. "Its posted
retail price in any given place in the Midwestern area was determined by- computing
the Mid-Continent spot market price and addihig thereto the tank car freight rate from
the Mid-Continent field, taxes and 5Y2 cents. The 53/2 cents was the equivalent of the
customary 2 cents jobber margin and 33/2 cents service station margin. In this manner
the retail price structure throughout the Midwestern area during the indictment period
was based in the main on Mid-Continent spot market quotations, or as stated by one
of the witnesses for the defendants, the spot market was a 'peg to hang the price
structure on'." Id. at 192, 60 Sup. Ct. at 830.
7841 STAT. 474 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (1940).
79
In the Valvoline case, the Court stated, "Section 1 (3) defines common carrier to
include 'all pipe line companies.' If this definition is not limited by the subsequent clause
'engaged ... as common carriers for hire,' extended consideration of these characteristics
of a private carrieris unnecessary as the language of the definition is decisive." (Italics
added.) As to the clause, "engaged as common carriers for hire," the Court stated,
"As'now written the section brings railroads under the Act by means of the last clause
of subsection (3) only. This clause is a conjunctive and not a modifier. It does not
affect the generality of the first clause as to pipe line companies." (Italics added.)
Valvoline Oil Co. v. United States, 308 U. S. 141, 144, 145, 60 Sup. Ct. 160, 162 (1939).
In the Champlin case, the Court stated, "Admittedly Champlin is not a common carrier
in the sense of the common law carrier for hire. However, the Act does not stop at
this but goes on to say that its use of the term 'conimon carrier' is to include all pipe
line companies-a meaningless addition if it thereby included only what the term without more always had included." The interpretation in the Valvoline case of the words
of the Act is accepted in footnote 4 of the Champlin opinion. Champlin Refining Co.
v. United States et al., - U. S. -, 67 Sup. Ct. 1, 2-3, n. 4 (1946).
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of the Uncle Sam Oil Company. As mentioned earlier, Justice Holmes excepted the Uncle Sam Company from the coverage of the Hepburn Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act because he did not believe it engaged
either in interstate commerce or'transportation under the Act.80 His view
of interstate commerce does not correspond with that generally taken by
the Court, and his interpretation of "transportation" does not correspond
with the evident intent of the legislation"' or with the Court's interpretation
in the Valvoline case of the words "common carrier." When the case of
Champlin was before the District Court, the Court advanced the opinion that
Justice Holmes had excluded the Uncle Sam Oil Company from the jurisdiction of the Act because it was a private carrier8 2 in operation at the time
the Hepburn Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act was passed and
to have classified it as a common carrier would have been arbitrary and in
contravention of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.83 Inasmuch
as Champlin began operations after the statute was passed and Justice Holmes
had upheld the applicability of the statute to future pipe lines,8 4 this Court
could see no legal objection to the regulation of Champlin, even though it
be considered a purely private carrier. But the statute makes no distinction
between "existing" pipe lines and "future" pipe lines.85 Therefore, it is
illogical to make its applicability depend upon the time a carrier began
operations.
Economic change in the employment of crude oil pipe lines presents a
realistic argument to the Court for no longer accepting the principle of the
Uncle Sam Company decision. During the early period in the development
of the oil industry refineries were located in or near the oil fields.88 A pipe
line supplying a refinery from private wells in nearby oil fields could be of
little use to anyone other than the owner of that refinery. The tendency in
recent years has been for the large oil companies to locate refineries near
concentrated markets and to bring oil to the refineries by crude oil pipe
lines. Mass markets permitted large refinery installations to be operated at
80

See note 25 supra.
2 SHARFMAN, loc. cit. supra note 37.
" See 4 WILIsToN, CoNTRacTs (Williston and Thompson, Rev. ed. 1936) § 1071.
81
See
82

A private carrier is here defined as one "who carries its own products or products in
which
it has a property interest."
83
Champlin Refining Co. v. United States, 59 F. Supp. 978, 981 (W. D. Okla. 1945).
84
The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 560, 34 Sup. Ct. 956, 958 (1914).
85
Before the Supreme Court decision in the Pipe Line Cases, a well-known legal
periodical carried an article stating the opinion that the Hepburn Act was unconstitutional because it applied to purely private pipe lines already in existence. Note (1912)
2686HAxv. L. Rv. 631.
Pogue, Economics of the Petroleum Industry, Part 14, Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, 7457 (1939). See note 70 supra.
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full capacity and economies of mass production to be realized. The pipe lines
reduced transportation costs, and the refineries were made less dependent
upon particular oil fields. Conceivably, a large oil company could carry to
its refinery through its pipe line crude oil obtained solely from its own wells.
In not buying the oil from the public before transporting it, it would be operating analogously to the Uncle Sam Oil Company, and would not be a common carrier according to the Court's ruling. But competition requires that
independent refiners be able to locate in the concentrated markets and obtain
crude oil by means of pipe lines. Legislation sought to achieve a competitive
condition in the oil industry by requiring the major oil companies to permit
other shippers use of their lines. 87 In view of the purpose of the legislation,
the questionable basis for the ruling of Justice Holmes in the Uncle Sam
Oil Company case, and the variance of the ruling of Justice Holmes with
recent Court interpretations of the wording of the- Interstate Commerce Act,
the Supreme Court should accord to the Interstate Commerce Commission
unequivocal jurisdiction over all interstate pipe lines, regardless of whether
or not they are employed in serving the public directly. This move would
correspond to economic change that has taken place since the Uncle Sam
Company case was decided.
If the Interstate Commerce Commission is to prosecute the mandate of
Congress to make pipe lines instruments of competition in the petroleum
industry, ambiguities surrounding its jurisdiction must be removed. The
decision of the Supreme Court in the Champlin case leaves important jurisdictional questions unsettled. Can a gasoline pipe line owned and operated
by an integrated oil company and used to carry gasoline from the company's
refinery to markets in other states be required to serve equally and at reasonable charges all shippers of gasoline who wish to avail themselves of it and
who can satisfy reasonable requirements as to its use? Can the same
requirements be made of a crude oil pipe line owned and operated by an
integrated oil company and used to carry crude oil interstate from the company oil wells- to its refinery located in a distant market? Confused handling
of questions of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court seems to require action
by Congress to clear up the muddle. Inasmuch as the Natural Gas Act of
1938,88 which regulates the transmission of natural gas across state lines
and its sale for resale, has been upheld as constitutional by the Supreme
Court,89 further legislation placing all interstate pipe line operations undis87

See 2 SHARFmAN, loc. cit. mspra note 18 and note 37.
8852 STAT. 821 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 717 (1940).
89
Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co. et a[., 314 U. S. 498,
62 Sup. Ct. 384 (1942).
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putably under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission should
be within the power of Congress to enact. Indeed the existence of that
power seems to be conceded by all the justices in the Champlin. case.
Regulation by the Interstate Commerce'Commission
The Interstate Commerce Commission construes broadly its jurisdiction
over interstate pipe lines. The assumption of jurisdiction by the Commission over the pipe line operations of the Valvoline Oil Company and the
Champlin Oil Company illustrate the broad view of its jurisdiction.90 The
Commission has recognized the principle set forth by the Supreme Court
in the Uncle Sam Oil .Company case that purely private pipe line operations
are not subject to its jurisdiction. 91 A recent ruling, however, indicates application in reverse of the principle set forth by the Supreme Court that a pipe
line should be considered a common carrier under the Interstate Commerce
Act when its operations are common carriage in substance but not in form.9 2
In this case, a pipe line that was in substance a purely private carrier was
designated a common carrier because one aspect of its operations took that
form. A'line only .56 miles in length,. built by a shipper of crude oil and
serving purely to connect the owner's refinery with a trunk pipe line operated
by another refining company, was held to be a common carrier pipe line
within the Interstate Commerce Act because the shipper-owner had concurred in the published rates covering jointly the haul over the trunk line
and the connecting line. This was done in spite of evidence that the shipper
had constructed the line as his only means of obtaining use of the trunk pipe
93
line facilities and had joined in the published rates under economic duress.
One commissioner, in a dissenting opinion, objected to this classification of
the connecting line as a common carrier, comparing this line to side tracks
and spur tracks built by shippers of railroads for their own private conveniende.9 4
That the connecting line is engaged in interstate commerce would seem
to follow from Supreme Court decisions 95 in which belt railroad lines per9
oPetition of the Valvoline Oil Company in the Matter of Valuation of Its Pipe Lines,
47 Val. Rep. 534 (1937) and 48 Val. Rep. 10 (1938); Champlin Refining Co. Valuation,
49 Val. Rep. 463, 467, 542, 548 (1942).
91
Gulf Pipe Line Co., 47 Val. Rep. 752 755 (1938); Petition of the Valvoline Oil
Company in the Matter of Valuation of Its Pipe Lines, 47 Val. Rep. 534, 538 (1937);
4892Val. Rep. 10, 14 (1938).
Minnelusa Oil Corp. et al. v. Continental Pipe Line Co. et al., 258 I. C. C. 41 (1944).
931d. at 45.
94
See Commissioner Alldredge's opinion, dissenting in part, id. at 62.
95
United States v. Union Stockyard Co., 226 U. S. 286, 33 Sup. Ct. 83 (1912) ; United
States v. California, 297 U. S. 175, 56 Sup. Ct. 421 (1936). See also Illinois Natural
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forming switching operations in connection with railroad terminals were
held to be engaged in interstate commerce because, in serving trunk railroad
lines carrying goods across state lines, they furnished a necessary link in
the chain of commerce. That the connecting pipe line- is a common carrier,
as were the terminal railroads, does not follow from these decisions, however.
The pipe line served only the shipper-owner while the terminal railroads
served all shippers using the trunk line railroads. The Supreme Court has
ruled-that common carrier status may result not only from what a carrier
97
does9 6 but from the right of the public to demand use of its facilities.
Where a common carrier railroad extended a spur track, as required by a
public service commission, and exercised the power of eminent domain in
acquiring the right of way, the Supreme Court held the track to be a part
of the public carrier system, although it served only a single shipper and
the initial cost was borne by the shipper though subject to reimbursement by
others who might subsequently make use of it.9 But in the case of the oil
pipe line, the shipper made the connection between the trunk pipe line and
his storage tanks and' not the company operating the common carrier trunk
pipe line. There is no evidence that a right of way was obtained by exercise
of a right of eminent domain. The oil company operating the trunk pipe line
refused to build the connecting line,9 9 and required the shipper not only to
build it but to join in published rates covering its operations as if it were a
part of the common carrier system. Since the shipper was not using the
line to furnish a service to the public and never intended anyone but himself
to use the line, it is difficult to see how the public may have any right to
demand use of it as a common carrier unless the wording of the Interstate
Commerce Act be interpreted to mean that all pipe line companies engaged
in interstate commerce are common carriers. 100
Joint rates covering the transportation of two carriers are allowable only
Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Service Co. et at., 314 U. S. 498, 509, 62 Sup. Ct. 384, 388
(1942). Here, a natural gas company operating pipe lines wholly within a state and
obtaining its supply of gas in continuous streams from sources outside of the State
was held to come within the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission under the
Natural Gas Act of 1938, since the activities of the company materially affected the
volume
of gas moving in interstate commerce.
96
297 U. S. 175, 181, 56 Sup. Ct. 421, 422 (1936).
97United States v. California,
Tap Line Cases, 234 U.-S. 1, 24, 34 Sup. Ct. 741, 746 (1914).
98
Union Lime Co. v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 233 U. S. 211, 34 Sup. Ct. 522
(1914).
99
Minnelusa Oil Corp. et al. v. Continental Pipe Line Co. et al., 258 I. C. C. 41,
45 0(1944).
OThe United States Supreme Court refused to consider a pipe line carrying oil across
state lines a common carrier in the Uncle Sam Oil Company decision. The Pipe Line
Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 562, 34 Sup. Ct. 956, 959 (1914). See note 24 supra.

1947]

PIPE LINE REGULATION

if both carriers are common carriers 1 and should not be taken as evidence
that the participants are common carriers. A division of rates between a
common carrier and a shipper who is bringing his product over his private
line to the transportation line of the common carrier has been held equivalent
to allowing rebates to such a shipper.10 2 In the case of railroads, the duty
of the public carrier railroad to serve the public is fulfilled when such carrier
delivers and accepts cars at some exchange track just clear of the main
track. 10 3 Service furnished by a shipper beyond that point for his own convenience is an industrial service for which he is not entitled to compensation
from the carrier. 0 4 Analogously, where the trunk pipe line companies are
not required by the Commission to extend service to shippers for a certain
distance from the line as are railroad companies 1 5 and shippers make these
connections for their own private benefit, there is no justification for the
common carrier company charging rates covering this service and paying
the shipper a share of these charges for performing this service when he is
not otherwise a common carrier by pipe line. 106 Such joint rate arrangements
present an opportunity for favoritism to be bestowed on certain shippers
and increase the power of the integrated company to place independent shippers at a competitive disadvantage. According to the law applying to railroads, these arrangements are illegal and should not be countenanced by the
Commission.
The powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission over pipe lines under
the Hepburn Act have been exercised less than its powers over any other
type of carrier subject to its jurisdiction. 0 7 Up to 1939, there had been
but one complaint dealt with by the Commission relating to rates and services
of oil pipe lines.'0 8 The general lack of complaint on the part of shippers
may be explained largely by the fact that the users of pipe lines are almost 101Tap Line Cases, 234 U. S. 1, 28, 34 Sup. Ct. 741, 748 (1914).
10 21d. at 23, 34 Sup. Ct. at 747; 2 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CoMMISsioN03 (1931) 151.
'0 4 Note (1914) 27 HARV. L. REv. 579.
' General Electric Co. v. New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co., 14 I. C. C.
237 (1908); New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v. General Electric Co., 219
N. Y. 227, 114 N. E. 115, 1 A. L. R. 1417, 1425 (1916) ; Solvay Process Co. v. Delaware,
Lackawanna
& Western R.R., 14 I. C. C. 246 (1908).
' 05 Tap Line Cases, 23 I. C. C. 277, 294 (1912). Here the Commission laid down the
rule that a line carrier has the obligation to extend service to any lumber mill within
3 miles of the line carrier. It would seem advisable to have a similar policy in the
case06of pipe lines.
1 Tap Line Cases, 234 U. S. 1, 28, 34 Sup. Ct. 741, 748 (1914).
1072 SHARFMAN,
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Thompson, Recent Steps in Governmental Regulation of Business (1942) 28
CORNELL L. Q. 1, 14. Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph No. 39,
Control of the Petroleum Industry by Major Oil Companies, 23 (1940).
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exclusively the owners.10 9 Another consideration is that it is very costly
for independent shippers to bring cases before the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The Commission's hands-off policy may be explained by the
rapid and generally satisfactory expansion of the industry due to the tremendous increase in use of petroleum products." 0
Since 1939, the Commission has taken regulatory action over rates and
service in three cases to relieve monopolistic situations created through
ownership of pipe lines by the major oil companies. As already pointed out,
the economic superiority of the pipe line over other means of transporting
petroleum long distances by land routes affords great competitive advantage
to an oil company controlling a pipe line. However, if independent oil companies can demand service of these pipe lines as common carriers under
the Hepburn Act, this advantage is lessened. In spite of common carrier
status, the integrated oil companies"' have been able to maintain their competitive advantage by charging rates greatly in excess of cost of service and
by imposing burdensome service requirements upon small shippers. The
chief example of the latter is the high minimum requirement placed on
quantities tendered for shipment. 112
The Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges case" 3 resulted from
an investigation made of crude oil pipe lines by the Interstate Commerce
Commission. This investigation of thirty-seven pipe line companies carrying
crude oil from the Southwest to Texas port cities and to Midwestern refinery
points showed that these companies actually were not giving common carrier
service as intended by law."'4 To bring about a wider use of the service, the
Commission ordered each pipe line carrier to lower its rates so that it would
not earn over eight per cent on the valuation placed by the Commission on
its investment.' 1 5
109
Reduced'Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I. C. C. 115, 121 (1940).
In Hearings before the Tempotary National Committee, Part 14, PETROLEUM INDusTRY, 7385, Mr. K. A. Crowley, an attc--ney for independent oil companies, testified,
"... many small shippers can't contest an tinfair rate for a lot of reasons. One is
money-th6 expense; and the other is that he doesn't dare get into a controversy withi
the major company because there is not one independent that can't be squeezed and
thrown out of business somewhere if they get down on him."
"UOThompson, Recent Steps in Governmental Regulation of Business (1942) 28 CoRNELL L. Q. 1, 14.
111The term "integrated oil companies" is used in this paper to mean a refining
company owning a pipe line and using it to obtain crude oil or to market refined petroleum2 products. See note 7 supra.
11 Note, Public Control of Petroleum Pipe Lines (1942) 51 YALE L. J.1338, 1340.
118243
I.C.C. 115 (1940).
14 d. at 121.
115Id. at 144. Section 19a of the INTERSTATE COMMERCE Acr directs the Interstate
Commerce Commission to investigate, ascertain, and report the value of all property
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The return was deemed adequate in view of the fact that high returns
had been earned by the companies, enabling them in the years 1929 to 1938
to return in dividends to their owners the entire original investment in the
pipe lines and to accumulate depreciation reserves through charges to operations that largely amortized their investment. 11 These profits over and
above adequate depreciation allowances were considered to nullify the argument of the pipe line companies that a high return was necessary to compensate for high industrial risks. The companies contended that their pipe
lines were plant facilities and that consequently pipe line profits could not
be distinguished from profits of all other operations, but the Commission
was not deflected from its purpose of regulating the returns to the pipe lines
117
as such.
The Commission declined to regulate the rates "en masse as a class" because "the pipe lines are less truly competitive with each other than is the
case with any of the other agencies of transport subject to our jurisdiction".118 One Commissioner, in a dissenting opinion, 1 9 criticized the regulation of pipe line rates from the standpoint of each company's earnings. He
insisted that it would result in each pipe line that carried oil from the midcontinent oil field to a common destination point, such as Chicago, having
a rate different from the others and, in consequence, traffic would move over
the line having the lowest rate, creating a need for a further lowering of the
rates of this line. The approach to rate-making taken by the Commission
in this case differs from that taken in regulating the rates of railroads, where
competition is allowed for.120 Since pipe lines are required by law to be
public transportation agencies, affording to shippers the opportunity of shipping by any one of several pipe lines, theoretically the Commissioner's arguowned or used by every common carrier subject to the provisions of the Act; 37 STAT.
701 (1913), 49 U. S. C. § 19a (1940). For a detailed account of the methods used in
arriving at pipe line property values, see Atlantic Refining Company Valuation, Appendix 4, 47 Val. Rep. 541, 584 (1937). The Commission made no valuation of the
pipe lines until 1934, when it decided to initiate valuation proceedings. The valuations
are published in special reports. See Prewitt, The Operation and Regulation of Crude
Oil
and Gasoline Pipe Lines (1942) 56 Q. J. EcoN. 177, 204.
'1 6Between Jan. 1, 1929 and June 30, 1938, the Stanolind Pipe Line Co. paid dividends
of 111% of its investment in addition to charging against operations depreciati9n amounting to 60% of its investment. The Company with the lowest earning had been able to pay
dividends ranging from 4.5% to 12% per annum on its outstanding capital stock in addition to making charges to operations for depreciation aggregating more than 62% of its
total investment. Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I. C. C. 115, 131
(1940).
1171d. at 141.
"1891d. at 144.
11 See dissenting opinion of Commissioner Mahaffie, id. at 145.
1203-B SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1936) 577 et seq.
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ment is a valid objection to this method of setting rates. However, the pipe
lines of the integrated oil companies do not actually compete with each other
for traffic, so this method of setting rates is both practicable and equitable.
It constitutes recognition by the Commission of the soundness of a proaching
regulation of petroleum pipe lines from the
i
oint of vie, monopolies, as compared to the horizontal point of view of competing common
carriers, such as railroads. The fact that the pipe lines carry only one commodity also causes their rate problem to be different from that of the railroads. If rates for transporting petroleum were set from the standpoint
of the rates of other pipe lines, they might be too high or too low from
the standpoint of a fair rate of return on the investment of individual pipe
lines. In the case of the railroads, the rates on specific commodities can
be set to allow for competition, while the average of all rates can be maintained at a level to maintain a fair rate of return on investment.
After considering evidence as to the intermingling of crude oil shipments
of varying quality and grade, the Commission decided that an excessive
degree of contamination would not result from limiting the minimum tender
required by the pipe lines of shippers to ten thousand barrels per shipment.' 2 '
The previous requirements had ranged from five hundred barrels to one
hundred thousand barrels. A former decision was cited as a precedent for
limiting the required tender to ten thousand barrels.1' The danger of contamination in the shipment of the different grades of crude oil was not considered as great as it was later considered where different types and grades
of refined petroleum were being shipped.'23 Although no conclusion can be
drawn as to the effect of such a minimum tender requirement upon the ability
of the independent refineries to make use of pipe line transportation, it is
certain that the very existence of this requirement places the competitive
124
advantage with the large oil companies.
12221Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I. C. C. 115, 136 (1940).
1 Brundred Brothers v. Prairie Pipe Line Co., 68 I. C. C. 458 (1922).
' 23 Petroleum Rail Shippers Association v. Alton and Southern Railroad et al., 243
I. C.
C. 589 (1941). See note 157 infra.
124Independent shippers may pool their shipments in order to have a sufficient quantity of oil to meet the required tender, but one great disadvantage of this plan is that
it is difficult to find individuals who wish to ship to the same destination. See Prewitt,
The Operation and Regulation of Cride Oil and Gasoline Pipe Lines (1942) 56 Q. J.
Eco N. 177, 184. In order to handle large shipments of oil, the small refinery must carry
an investment in large storage facilities in addition to the investment in the oil. See
Note, Public Control of Petroleum Pipe Lines (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1338, 1343. Since
the Interstate Commerce Commission allows the pipe line company to include in its
investment for rate- making purposes the investment in storage facilities reasonably
necessary to common carrier operations, there would seem to be no good reason why
the pipe line should not be required to furnish storage facilities to small shippers for
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In the case of Petroleum Rail Shippers Association v. Alton and Southern
Railroad et al.,125 independent oil refineries in the mid-continent field complained that they were being crowded out of the gasoline market in various
Midwestern and North Central States. The reason, they alleged, was the
charging of high and discriminatory rates by both the pipe lines and the
railroads. They contended that they were losing this market to the large
integrated oil companies, who charged the same rates over their pipe lines
to terminal points as the railroads charged, and who received back a large
part of these charges as dividends on stock owned in the pipe lines. These
high dividend returns were alleged to be rebates and enabled the integrated
oif companies to make price concessions and other concessions to jobbers
and retailers of gasoline and to gain control over the marketing outlets.
After considering the evidence of the independent companies concerning
the market, the Commission found that the decrease in their sales was not entirely due to the competitive advantage of the companies owning pipe lines.'2
Refineries in the destination territory were getting some of the lost business.
There was no movement of gasoline by pipe line to these markets until
193 1.127 Since that time, the amount of gasoline moving by pipe line increased, and in 1939 it was 16.9 per cent of the gasoline consumption in the
destination states.12 8 However, before the development of gasoline pipe lines,
there had been a great increase in the refinery capacity in the destination
states, as compared to the territory of origin. This fact was due to the
movement for many years of crude oil by the pipe lines of major oil companies to serve refineries located at the market and to the more recent
development of new wells being opened in Illinois and Michigan.
However, much of the difficulty experienced by the independent shippers
in competing in the Midwest markets was attributed by the Commission
the accumulation of oil in quantities necessary to meet the required tenders. See Atlantic
Pipe Line Co. Valuation, 47 Val. Rep. 541, 545-548 (1937); Gulf Pipe Line Co. Valuation, 47 Val. Rep. 752, 754, 756-757 (1938); Texas Pipe Line Co., 48 Val. Rep. 249,
251-252 (1938); Magnolia Pipe Line Co., 48 Val. Rep. 775, 778 (1939). Reasonable
storage facilities at the terminal points would also seem necessary, since consignees
may not be prepared to accept delivery of the quantities of oil shipped. Pipe line tariffs
generally provide that crude oil will not be accepted for shipment unless provision is
made for immediate acceptance in the consignee's tanks at destination. See Prewitt,
srupra, at 186. The tariffs of the Humble Pipe Line Co. provide for free storage for
five days at or near destination, with demurrage charges on oil tendered for delivery
but remaining undelivered after the expiration of the free time. Humble Pipe Line Co.
Valuation, 48 Val. Rep. 208, 212 (1938).

125243
I. C. C. 589 (1941).
1201d. at 594, 599.
127The process of electric welding was applied to pipe lines about that time and per-

mitted
their use for transportation of gasoline; id. at 600. See note 65 supra.
2
1 8Id. at 602.
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29

to high rail rates.1 It was discovered that when the railroads increased
their rates in 1938, theit revenues from oil shipments greatly decreased.
Therefore, while the usual rule is for rates to be set so that traffic will move,
here the rates had been set so that traffic didn't move.' 3 Consequently, the
Commission ordered substantial reductions in the rail rates on the ground
that the value of the service of hauling petroleum by rail had greatly decreased.' 3 ' However, the Commission rejected the argument of the complainants that the rail rates should be lowered to the point of equality with
the ultimate costs of pipe line transportation to the integrated oil companies
after dividends from the subsidiary pipe line companies had been considered. 13 2 Thus, although the Commission may lower rates to meet changing
competitive conditions, it may not lower them to the point of abandoning
the principle of allowing charges sufficient to cover the operating costs of
supplying tie service plus a fair rate of return on capital invested.3'
The Commission also recommended' 3 4 that the railroads study carefully
the proposal of the independent oil companies that multiple car rates be established to meet the competition of pipe lines. Multiple car shipments in blocks
of twenty-five carloads moving intact from one consignor at one point of
origin to one consignee at one point of destination would present to the
railroads the principal economy 13 5 of less handling of cars in terminals. 36
However, such movements would necessitate additional freight train miles
due to the necessity of maintaining train schedules regardless of large variations in the tonnage of petroleum shipped, the inability of many scheduled
trains to handle a shipment of petroleum as great as twenty-five cars, and
back-hauling resulting from more of the petroleum traffic being .sent through
to terminal points under multiple car rates.' 7 Some of these objections would
be overcome if the shipments were permitted to move at the operating
convenience of the carrier, i.e. in restricted service,'1 3 instead of required to
move on a definite schedule, i.e. in preferred service. Restricted service
129Id. at 618.
1301d. at 639.
'-lld.
at 665.
1332Id,at 639.
' 4 See concurring opinion of Chairman Eastman, id. at 665.
13
Id. at 655.
' 3 5Other economies would result from direct shipment to destination with fewer stops
and less time required in shipment,--one bill of lading, one collection of charges for
freight, and one entry on the way bill. See 3-B SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
CommissioN
(1936) 396, n. 141, 407.
' 36 Petroleum Rail Shippers Association v. Alton & Southern Railroad, 243 I. C. C.
589, 651, 652 (1941).
137Id. at 648-650.
1381d. at 652-654.
-
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would allow a reservoir of freight to be built up permitting the most economical loading of trains, the moving of traffic in drag service with savings
in the use of locomotives of lower power rating, and the reduction in overtime hours carrying penalty rates of pay.
From the standpoint of the petroleum shipper, multiple car shipments in
restricted service present the disadvantages of requiring a greater investment
in tank cars and in storage facilities.'8 9 The oil companies make most of
their shipments in leased private tank cars,140 and the additional time of a
car in transit would add to their costs of leasing cars. Where the tank car
is detained by the shipper an' unreasonable length of time in loading and
unloading, the carrier may make a reasonable demurrage charge to compensate for the use of the car and of the track which the car occupies.' 4 ' Even
though the shipper provides his own cars, the carrier still may make a reason42
able demurrage charge when the car is in the service of the railroad.
Also, the shipper would find it necessary to increase his investment in storage
facilities at the points of origin and destination. To the extent that these
factors caused an increase in the shipper's costs, the economy of the multiple
car rate would be lessened.
In general, the Commission has not allowed lower rates on multiple car
1391d. at 654. The United States Supreme-Court has ruled that under the Interstate
Commerce Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission does not have the power to
require the railroad companies to furnish tank cars to shippers, where no question of
discrimination is involved, the duty to furnish such cars, if it exists, being enforceable
in the courts, and not by the Commission. United States v. Pennsylvania R.R., 242
U. S.208, 37 Sup. Ct. 95 (1916). The cases passing directly on the question have
held that tank cars are an exception to the general rule that a railroad must furnish
suitable facilities to carry goods which it assumes to transport. This exception is based

on the extraordinary requirement that special cars be used to carry each type of oil,
making it uneconomical for the carrier to provide such cars, on the custom for such
cars to be provided by private owners, and on the provision in the published tariffs of
the carriers for carrying oil that carriers assume no obligation to furnish tank cars.
St. Louis & S. F. R.R. v. State, 76 Okla. 60, 184 Pac. 442, 7 A. L. R. 140, 143 (1919) ;
Chicago, R. I. & P. R.R. v. Lawtoi Refining Co., 253 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).

See also In the Matter of Private Cars, 50 I. C. C. 652, where the Commission made
inquiry into the rules, regulations and practices governing the operation of private
cars on the railroads of the country. This investigation of the Commission constitutes
the 4basis for the ruling of the Courts.
1 Olbid.

14lBrandeis, J. in Turner, Dennis & Lowry Lumber Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee &

St. Paul R.R., 271 U. S.259, 262, 46 Sup. Ct. 530, 531 (1926). It is the duty of the
shipper to load and unload carload freight. 4 WiLtisroN, CONltAcrS (Williston &
Rev. ed., 1936) §§ 1099A, 1099C.
Thompson,
142 For a resum6 of the law of demurrage applicable to interstate railroads, see 4
WILIsToN, CoNTRAcrs (Williston & Thompson, Rev. ed., 1936) §§ 1099A, 1099C.
Under Interstate Commerce Commission Uniform Demurrage Code private cars while
in railroad service, whether on carrier's or private tracks, are subject to the demurrage
rules the same as cars of railroad ownership.
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shipments than on single car shipments.1 43 The wholesale principle that the
purchaser of large quantities of goods should pay less than the purchaser
of small quantities has generally been disapproved in the transportation field,
on the ground that lower rates on large quantity shipments give the large
shipper a prefefence over the small shipper. 44 The principle is predicated
upon the social desirability of maintaining an economy in which the little
concern can compete with the big concern.' 45
Although the Interstate Commerce Commission has rejected as illegal the
wholesale theory of rate making, it very early allowed a differential in rates
46
between carload shipments and less than carload shipments of petroleum'
47
because of marked differences in cost between the two modes of shipment.
This was done in spite of the complaint of a considerable number of small
oil companies. This departure from the theory of equal rates to all users
assumes that the carload shipment is a unit of service of a size that the
majority of shippers are prepared to make.' 48 The Commission has not
generally required carload rates, however, and -has very cautiously allowed
them.' 49

The objection to multiple car rates does not apply where they are needed
to meet the competition of pipe lines, since the pipe lines carry the petroleum
of large shippers and not the railroads. The principle of allowing the railroads to charge mutiple car rates to meet the competition of other modes
of transportation has been recognized and applied by the Commission in the
case of water transportation where the unit of transportation was equivalent
to a number of carloads.5 0 Although there is precedence for multiple car
143 Molasses from New Orleans, La. to Peoria and Pekin, Ill., 235 I. C. C. 485,
495-498 (1939). Here the principal Commission cases disapproving of multiple car rates
are discussed. Multiple car rates on shipments of cattle, grain, cotton, and logs have
been disapproved. See 3-B SHAFMiAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1936)
407. For application of the same rule in state regulation of railroads, see Public Service
Comm. v. State ex rel. Great Northern Ry., 118 Wash. 629, 634, 204 Pac. 791, 793,
25 A.
L. R. 186, 192 (1922).
144 Robinson, Busitess Enterprise and the Public Utility's Dity to Serve Without
Discrimination (1928) 13 MINN. L. REv. 104. See also Burlington C. R. & N. R. Co.
v. Northwestern
Fuel Co., 31 Fed. 652 (C. C. D. Minn. 1887).
145 Ibid. See also, concurring opinion of Chairman Eastman' in Molasses from New
Orleans, La. to Peoria and Pekin, Ill., 235 I. C. C. 485, 502 (1939).
146Scofield v. Lake Shore & Michigan R.R., 2 I. C. C. 67 (1888). See 3-B SHARFMAN,
THE47 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1936) 407.
1 lnterstate Commerce Comm. v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R.R., 220 U. S.
235, 240, 31 Sup. Ct. 392, 394 (1911) extended this to express and freight forwarders'
shipments.
1483-B SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1936) 398.

1491bid.
5

3 OMolasses from New Orleans, La. to Peoria and Pekin, Ill., 235 I. C. C. 485, 487
(1939). In transporting blackstrap molasses up the Mississippi River, the Solvents
Corporation operated tank barges whose capacity was equivalent to 25 tank cars.
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rates on shipments of gasoline from the Southwest to the Midwest market
the evidence of advantages and disadvantages to the railroads of receiving
train load shipments was considered by the Commission not to be sufficient
51
to justify the adoption of such rates.'
The Commission substantially reduced the rates charged by the two pipe
line companies carrying gasoline from the mid-continent area to the Middle
West.' 52 It found the rates unreasonable from the standpoint of allowing
a fair return on the fair value of the investment. Since the two companies
had average earnings between 1933-1938 of about thirty per cent of the
investment in their property less depreciation, the rates were dearly excessive. Business risks resulting from a diminishing supply of crude oil in the
Southwest, competition of truck and water transportation, and discovery of
new sources of crude oil within the destination territory were all allowed for
in the setting of rates to yield a return of ten per cent on the investment in
the pipe lines as determined by the Commission. 53 However, if past performance be taken as a standard, the rates set by the Commission would
permit a higher return than ten per cent of the investment.1 54
The Commission found no undue preference or prejudice to exist in rates
charged for pipe line transportation by the pipe lines and for rail transportation by the railroads, since these rates were charged on hauls by different
carriers. 155 The practice of the pipe lines of charging proportional rates on
shipments to points of destination that could be reached only by rail from
the terminals of the pipe lines, so as to make the cost of shipping over the
part pipe line and part rail route equal to the cost of shipping over the
through rail route, was not objected to in principle. Railroads had been
permitted to set rates in a similar fashion to meet competition. However,
these rates were ordered eliminated, because there would be no purpose in
retaining them at the much lower pipeline rates. Since the purpose of pipe
line regulation is to promote competition among shippers of petroleum, the
151 Petroleum Rail Shippers Association v. Alton & Southern R.R., 243 I. C. C. 589,
654 2(1941).
15 Id. at 665. For example, the previous rate to Kansas City of 19.48 cents per 100
lbs. was reduced to 10 cents. The two pipe lines were the Great Lakes pipe line, serving
eight major refining companies, and the Phillips pipe line serving the Phillips Petroleum
Co. These were the two longest gasoline trunk pipe lines in the United States in 1940.
In 1939, gasoline transported by these two lines to Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, and Missouri was
per cent of the total consumption in these states. Id. at 601.
16.9
15 3 Petroleum Rail Shippers Ass'n v. Alton and Southern R.R. et al., 243 I. C. C.
589, 662 (1941).
15Id. at 663.

155Id. at 640.
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proportional rate should not be countenanced by the Commission. It enables
uniform prices to be quoted on gasoline to bulk buyers. It serves solely to
benefit the integrated company and reduces competition between integrated
companies as well as between the integrated company and the independent. 5 6
In setting reasonable minimum tender requirements on pipe line shipments,
the Commission recognized the importance of large tenders in preventing
inefficiency due to the frequent shifting from one tank to another and in
preventing contamination of product through the mixing of different grades
of gasoline. 157 For regular shipments, the existing minimum tender requirement of twenty-five thousand barrels was upheld. However, for shipments
made subject to delayed service, 15 a minimum tender of five thousand barrels was held sufficient.
Although the Commission granted relief to the independent companies by
lowering rates and changing the tender requirements, it refused to take
action to eliminate certain alleged unfair marketing practices of the integrated
companies on the ground that the Federal Trade Commission was the proper
tribunal before which to bring these complaints. These practices were the
trading of gasoline on a barter basis by the integrated companies to eliminate
transporting gasoline by rail to points off the route of one company's pipe
line but on the route of the other company's pipe line, local price cutting,
and concessions to service stations.159 The trading of gasoline by the major
companies permits a company to place gasoline in a market distant from its
pipe line at a cost much lower than that of the independent oil company that
must pay the published rate of the pipe line or the rate for shipment by rail.
-1'4Qne writer states that the proportional rate "enables those who ship by pipe line
to quote a price to distributors at points distant from the pipe line terminal in such a
way that the rail shipper has no advantage. The proportional rate structure also enables
the user of the pipe line to enter a market area that might otherwise be closed to him.
Since the gasoline lines are used almost exclusively by the large integrated companies,
the proportional rate is an effective means of limiting competition among the integrated
companies, or between the integrated companies and the independents." See Prewitt,
The Operation.aia Regulation of Crude Oil and Gasoline Pipe Lines (1942) 56 Q. 3.
EcoN.
177, 193.
157 Petroleum Rail Shippers Association v. Alton and Southern R.R., et al., 243 I. C. C.
589,
15 657 (1941). See note 123 supra.
SDelayed service would enable the accumulation of large enough quantities of a
given type of gasoline to permit economical transportation. Id. at 638. The pipe line
is allowed by the Interstate Commerce Commission to include in its investment for ratemaking purposes, the investment in storage facilities reasonably necessary to carry on
common carrier operations but it is not required to furnish these facilities. See note
1245 supra.
1 9 Some of these concessions were: low rental charges to service station lessees, the
subleasing of service stations at rental charges much lower than the rental paid in the
original lease of the station by the oil company, excessive commissions to agents to be
passed on to dealers, and valuable free advertising displays furnished to retailers. .

1947]

PIPE LINE REGULATION

.367

This practice amounts to the hauling of gasoline by the major oil companies
for each other and the charging of discriminatory rates. The impotency of
the Commission to stop this practice, which has the same effect as the unlawful charging of discriminatory rates, exemplifies the ineffectiveness of a
regulatory approach that seeks to counteract monopoly by controlling only
one of the closely related phases of the monopolist's business.
The action of the Commission in this case in lowering the rates of the
railroads and the pipe lines cannot be considered a solution of the problem
of competing with the integrated oil companies that confronted the independent companies. The maximum rates for rail transportation to the terminal points of the pipe lines were set much higher than the maximum rates
for pipe line transportation to the same points. Many of the independents
were located several hundred miles from the pipe lines and could not readily
make connections with them. Also, where they could reach the pipe lines of
the integrated companies, the independent shippers had the, expense of erecting storage tanks at both the. point of origin and point of destination: The
pipe line rates allowed were still high enough to allow the integrated company
a considerable advantage over an independent shipper who might use the
line, since they permitted the integrated company to employ its capital at
the favorable return of ten per cent of investment after all operating costs
were covered. There was still the difficulty to the small shipper of meeting
a minimum tender requirement.
In the case of Minnelusa Oil Corporationet al. v. Continental Pipe Line
Company et al., 1 60 an independent producer of crude oil and an independent
refiner complained to the Commission that rates charged for transportation
over pipe lines owned and operated by refining companies that were affiliated
with the Standard Oil Company of Indiana were unreasonable and discriminatory. The rates complained of were for carrying crude oil westward from
fields in Wyonming to the refinery of the independent company, the Wasatch
Oil Refining Company, located just outside of Salt Lake City. The integrated company, Utah Oil Refining Company, had its refinery at Salt Lake
City, also. It was alleged that the pipe line company that was owned lby the
Utah Oil Refining Company was giving rebates and discriminating between
shippers in charging excessively high rates and returning part of the charges
as dividends to its owner.
A comparison of the rates charged by this pipe line company with. rates
charged by pipe line companies affiliated with it and carrying crude oil east160258 I. C. C. 41 (1944).
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ward from the same field showed these 'rates to be exceptionally high.' 61
The Commission ordered the rates lowered so that a rate of return of eight
per cent on the investment would be earned in addition to the operating
costs.' 62 In passing on the propriety of the operating costs of the pipe line
company from the standpoint of reasonable rates,.the Commission disallowed
excess profits taxes for the reason that they were abnormal and temporary' 63
but allowed income" taxes because they had been classified by the Supreme
Court as an operating expense to be covered in setting reasonable rates. 64
The Commission justified the eight per cent return on investment as an
adequate reward for the risks that were being borre for the reasons that
there was good evidence of a remaining life of twenty to twenty-five years
for the crude oil fields served by the pipe line, that affiliation of the principal
shipper and large owner of crude oil reserves with the pipe line company
assured to the pipe line company a demand for its services, that the depreciation rates would amortize the investment in the pipe line in twenty-five
years, and that profits in the past exceeded one half the amount of the
investment and were in addition to adequate depreciation allowances. 165 The
Commission justified its allowance of a return here lower than the return
of ten per cent allowed previously on investment in gasoline pipe lines on
the ground that there are greater hazards and risks involved in gasoline pipe
line ventures. 66 No allowance was made in the rate of return for operating
conditions that were due to the geographical location of the pipe line, since
operating costs reflected these conditions and were separately allowed for.
The Commission held that the high rates being charged were a violation
of the provisions of the Act prohibiting special rates and rebates,, undue
167
preferences or prejudices, and the charging of other than published rates,
16'The line going west passed over higher altitude than the line going east and in
doing so had to contend with lower temperatures which increased the viscosity of the
oil and the pumping costs. Also, the smaller diameter of the pipe line west as compared
with the line east increased the cost of pumping. These operating differences could fiot
fully
account for the rate difference, however. Id. at 46.
162 1n Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges Case, 243 I. C. C. 115 (1940)
the Commission also had allowed an eight per cent return on the valuation of crude
oil pipe lines.
163d. at 48.
164 Galveston Electric Co. v. City of Galveston, 258 U. S. 388, 42 Sup. Ct. 351 (1922);
Georgia Railway & Power Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Georgia, 262 U. S. 625, 43 Sup.
Ct. 65680 (1923).
' Minnelusa Oil Corp. et al. v. Continental Pipe Line Co. et al., 258 I. C. C. 41,
52 (1944).
1661d. at 56.
16724 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 2 (1940) ; 24 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U. S. C.
§ 3 (1940); 34 STAT. 587 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 6 (7) (1940).
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but found the new rates at much lower levels to eliminate these objections.' s
In holding these charges to be discriminatory, the Commission necessarily
looked through the legal fiction of the two corporate entities, that of the
pipe line corporation and of the shipper-owner refining company. The question of the shipper's right to damages because of these discriminatory rates
was then considered. Since the independent refining company had concurred
in the publication of joint rates covering, the haul from the oil fields over
the integrated oil company's trunk line and its own connecting line, it was
held to be a tortfeasor up to the time of filing its complaint and, consequently,
to be estopped from maintaining an action for damages under rates it was
itself instrumental in imposing.'6 9 However, damages were allowed the independent shipper because of excessive rates paid to the integrated oil company
for shipments of oil made after the time of filing its complaint. The independent oil company submitted testimony seeking to prove losses suffered
through the shrinking of its sales price to meet the competition of the integrated oil company, but more adequate proof was found necessary to sustain
170
an award of damages on this account.
This action in awarding damages because of discrimination in rates should
encourage other independent oil companies shipping over the pipe lines of
the integrated oil companies to seek similar redress. However, in allowing
a return on pipe line investment as high as eight per cent, the Commission
is still permitting the integrated oil company to receive a substantial amount
of the charges paid for pipe line transportation as dividends on stock ownership in the pipe lines and thereby to maintain a competitive advantage over
the independent shipper.
Regulation Through the Elkins Act
Another approach to regulation of the common carrier petroleum pipe line
is through the Elkins Act, which makes it a criminal offense for a person
or corporation, whether carrier or shipper, knowingly to allow or to receive
rebates or concessions or to depart in any way from the published tariff? 7 1
Under this Act, anyone guilty of accepting a rebate shall, in addition to fines
imposed, forfeit to the United States three times the amount of money so
received in the six months period prior to commencement of court action
by the Attorney General of the United States. 72 Also, injunctive proceed1O~Minnelusa Oil Corp. et a[. v. Continental Pipe Line Co. et al.,

58 (1944).
16Id.
0

at 60.

17 1d. at 58.
3.132 STAT. 847
17234 STAT. 588

(1903), 49 U.S. C. § 41 (1) (1940).
(1906), 49 U. S. C. § 41 (3) (1940).

258 I. C. C. 41,
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ings may be instituted in a Federal District Court by either the Interstate
Commerce Commission or the Attorney General of the United States to
enforce the published tariffs. 73
In 1940, the United States brought suit against twenty major oil companies
and fifty-nine pipe line companies to enjoin further violation of the Elkins
Act 174 and that section of the Interstate Commerce Act forbidding rebates. 17
Action was brought also to recover triple the amount of rebates paid the
oil company owners, as provided in the Elkins Act. 176 The result of this
suit was a consent decree. 177 The main provisions of this decree was to
limit dividends that could be paid a shipper-owner during any one year to
seven per cent of the shipper-owner's share of the valuation of the common
carrier's property. The base investment on which dividends could be paid
could not be increased by accumulation of surplus. The uses to which any
accumulation of surplus could be put were restricted to those serving operating needs and to retiring debts incurred in acquiring pipe line property.
The objective of the United States in this decree was clearly to bring about
a lowering of pipe line rates by removing the opportunity to obtain large
rebates in the form of dividends.' According to one writer, this decree is
not likely to bring about a lowering of rates, since the amount of savings
to the oil companies resulting from lower charges made by their affiliated
pipe lines would be offset by the decrease in sales revenues resulting from
increased competition of small refining companies making use of the pipe
lines at the lower rates.& 7 Also, the parent oil company stands to get
back those rate payments which have contributed to the surplus of the pipe
line company, if the property of the subsidiary pipe line company is eventually sold.
Although the Supreme Court was not called to rule on whether or not
these companies were violating the Elkins Act,' 79 recent decisions indicate a
17832

STAT.

17432 STAT.

1741 STAT.

848 (1903), 49 U. S. C. § 43 (1940).
847 (1903), 49 U. S.C. §41 (1940).
483 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 6 (7) (1940).

176
United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co. et al., 36 F. Supp. 480 (D. C. Del. 1941)
decided a question of venue. It held that the civil action under the Elkins Act could
be brought in either the state of incorporation or in the state where the transportation
from
which the rebates resulted took place.
177
United States v. Atlantic Refining Co. et al., Civil Action 14060 (D. C. D. C. 1941)
(unreported). For a full discussion of this decree, see Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J.
1338, 1348. Also, Two Pipe Lines for Sale (Jan. 1945) 31 FORTUFE 129. Here it is

stated that the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice made it clear at the
time of the consent decree that it was possible that the suit against the pipe lines would
be178
revived after the war.
Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1338, 1351.
17
9In

its corporate report, Oct. 19, 1940, The Phillips Petroleum Co. argued that it
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tendency of the Court to interpret the Act broadly to bring about equal
treatment of shippers. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company et al. v.
United States et al.,' s° interstate rail carriers at the Port of New York
were furnishing commercial warehouse space to shippers and charging less
than cost, the warehouses being operated in some instances by subsidiary
companies of the railroads. The Court ruled that this was a violation of the
Elkins Act prohibiting rebates. The fact that the shipper paid the fair or
market value of the warehouse services was held immaterial ;""1 it was enough
that the carrier was absorbing losses on its warehouse operations by means
of income from carrier operations.18 2 Likewise, in absorbing losses on marketing operations by means of profits on pipe line operations, it might be
reasoned that the integrated oil companies accord themselves preferential
treatment as shippers and thereby violate the Act. Again, in Union Pacific
Railroad Company et al. v. United States et al.,18 3 the Elkins Act was broadly
interpreted by the majority of the Court. It was held to extend to concessions granted by the City of Kansas City, Kansas, to induce wholesale
produce dealers to move their places of business from across the river in
Kansas City, Missouri, to the new city owned market located at the terminal
of the Union Pacific Railroad in Kansas City, Kansas. The market had been
promoted by the Union Pacific Railroad in order to increase the volume of
its traffic. The majority of the Court 8 4 ruled that the words of the Act
forbidding "any persons, person or corporation" offering concessions "in
respect to transportation"''t extended to third parties, in this case a municipality. Much attention was given to the fact that the "railroad was the
leading and dominant influence in the entire transaction."' 88
In an early case involving the Elkins Act, the Supreme Court gave broad
is not violating the Elkins Act in receiving dividends from its subsidiary pipe line
company or in shipping its own oil at cost, which is less that the published rate, through
a department, because these operating methods had been practiced ever since pipe lines
were made common carriers in 1906. See note 193 infra.
180305
U. S. 507, 59 Sup. Ct 284 (1939).
181 1d. at 523, 59 Sup. Ct at 290.
182A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in holding that rates below
cost for shipping particular commodities were arbitrary and could not be justified simply
because the losses were made up in making charges correspondingly higher above cost
for shipping other commodities. Northern Pacific R.R. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S.
585, 35 Sup. Ct. 429 (1915) ; Ann Arbor R.R. v. United States, 281 U. S. 658, 50 Sup.
Ct. 444 (1930).
183313 U. S. 451, 61 Sup. Ct. 1064 (1941).
184 Three justices dissented on the ground that the Elkins Act was not intended to
forbid inducements by 'third parties made to prospective shippers of a railroad to get
them
to locate in the city and to use the railroad.
1
851d. at 462, 61 Sup. Ct. at 1072.
186Id. at 467, 61 Sup. Ct. at 1074.
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interpretation 8 7 to the words of the Act forbidding the carrier to remit by
any device any portion of the rate. The device need not be fraudulent but
may include "all means and methods" by which preference is granted. 8 8
According to one writer, 8 9 stock ownership would be such a device when
part of a plan to permit the owner to ship his product at cost while other
shippers-pay the published rate. Shortly after the Elkins Act was passed,
the United States brought a successful suit to enjoin the payment of rebates
in the guise of freight procurement fees to a dummy corporation set up by
the Pabst Brewing Company to operate its refrigerator cars.190 There was
definite evidence that the subsidiary transit company had been organized to
defeat the Elkins Act, so the District Court disregarded the separate corporate entities of the two companies and looked at them as an association of
individuals. But here the relationship between the parent company and the
subsidiary company must be distinguished from that between the oil companies and their pipe lines because of its fraudulent character.
In order to be guilty of crime under the Elkins Act, a carrier or shipper
must knowingly violate it.191 Ignorance that a concession is a violation of
the Act has been held to be no excuse for violation. 19 2 Yet where a shipper
was led by the Interstate Commerce Commission to believe that the rates,
which were published with the concession shown, were legal, the word
"knowingly" was given exculpating effect.' 93 Since the pipe line companies
publish their tariffs with the Interstate Commerce Commission and the fact
of their ownership by the oil companies is known to the Commission, it
may be argued that the oil companies are not guilty of a crime- in receiving
rebates from the published tariffs in the form of dividends. "
Separation of the pipe lines from ownership by the oil companies has been
proposed 1 94 It is contended that the major oil companies that own the
'S 78 Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 28 Sup. Ct. 428 (1908).
18 1d, at 71, 28 Sup. Ct. at 431.
189 Black, Oil Pipe Line Divorcement by Litigation and Legislation (1940) 25 CoRNEM

L. Q. 510.

19oUnited States v. Milwaukee Refrigeration Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247 (C. C. E. D.
Wis. 1905).
19132
STAT. 847 (1903), 49 U. S. C. § 41 (1940).
Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56, 28 Sup. Ct. 428 (1908).
192
Armour
' 93 Lehigh Coal and Navigation Co. v. United States, 250 U. S. 556, 565, 40 Sup. Ct.
24, 94
26 (1919).
1 President Roosevelt recommended divorcement of the pipe lines from their oil
company owners in his message to Congress in 1933. See Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, Part XIV, PETROLEUm INDUSTRY (1940) 7378.
Chairman Lea of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee of the House introduced H. R. 4862, 1st Session of 76th Congress, to apply the Commodities Clause to oil
and gas. Id. at 7655, 7656.
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pipe lines will maintain their powerful hold on the petroleum markets until
this action is taken. One writer believes there is existing power under the
Interstate Commerce Act and the Elkins Act to achieve this divorcement by
litigation. 195 Another authority holds that inasmuch as the Hepburn Amendment, which brought the pipe lines within the Interstate Commerce Act,
also introduced the Commodities Clause and applied it to the railroads and
not to the pipe lines, Congress has adopted a policy of permitting oil company ownership of the pipe lines. Therefore, legislation, instead of litigation,
is the proper avenue of reform. 9 6
Some indication of the likely success of divorcement by litigation under
97
the Elkins Act may be found in the enforcement of the Commodities Clause'
of the Interstate Commerce Act, which applies to railroads affiliated with
shippers. In the early decisions, the Supreme Court held that entire ownership of stock in a producing company 9 s by a railroad would not, in itself,
violate the Clause, but that identity of management'09 of the two companies,
would serve to bring them under it. Identity of management also was held
to cause violation of the Clause when achieved by a common holding company.20 0 In a more recent case involving a common holding company, where
the holding company was externally disassociated 20 1 from its common carrier
subsidiary and its producing company shipper subsidiaries, the majority
of the Supreme Court refused to uphold application of the Clause.2 0 2 How95

25
L. Q. 510. The litigation argument is based on the case of New York, New
Haven & Hartford R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361, 26 Sup.
Ct. 272 (1906). Also,.the author of this article contends that divorcement of the oil
pipe lines from the integrated oil companies could be accomplished through enforcement
of the anti-trust laws. See Note (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 1338, 1350, n. 72; Two Pipe
Lines for Sale (Jan. 1945) 31 FORTUNE 125, 129 for comment on suit brought by the
Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice under the Sherman Act to force the
integrated oil companies to divest themselves of their pipe lines, United States v.
American Petroleum Institute, Civil Action 8524 (D. C. D. C. 1940). At the suggestion
of the Office of Production Management, the suit was dropped so as not to interfere
with96 the war effort
1 See Thompson, Recent Steps in Governmental Regulation of Blsiwss (1942) 28
CORNELL L. Q. 1.
19734 STAT. 585 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (8) (1940). This Clause prohibits a railroad
carrying, except for its own use, commodities which it may own or in which it may
have an interest, direct or indirect. It was aimed at divorcement of the railroads from
coal98 companies.
' 99 United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 29 Sup. Ct. 527 (1909).
' United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 220 U. S. 257, 31 Sup. Ct 387 (1911).
20
OUnited States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26, 40 Sup. Ct. 425 (1920).
20
'This external dissociation was achieved by having no common directors or officers,
separate
accounting systems, and separate ownership of operating facilities.
202
United States v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Ry., 298 U. S. 492, 56 Sup. Ct. 841
(1936). See Note (1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 427 for discussion of this case.
1

See Black, Oil Pipe Line Divorcement by Litigatiot and Legislation (1940)
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ever, evidence of managerial control of the subsidiaries by the holding company caused Justices Brandeis, Cardozo and Stone to dissent on the ground
that there was no real separation of interests. In view of the economic interdependence of pipe line and refinery operations, the rapid development of
pipe lines by integrated oil companies, and their importance in the whole
transportation system, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would read
into the Elkins Act a commodities clause pertaining to pipe lines and enforce
this implied commodities clause more strictly than it has the statutory Commodities Clause which pertains to railroads.
Conclusions
Where a few large firms in an industry through employment, of superior
instruments of production have been able to attain great economic advantage over small rival firms, there is a tendency away from competition.
Profits from the employment of superior methods of production may be used
in other areas where no advantage in efficiency exists to reduce competition
there. Thus, the movement towards'monopoly is intensified. The petroleum
industry appears to be moving down this road. In this industry, the pipe
line provides a highly efficient means of long distance, overland transportation. Its employment is limited to large firms that can raise the large amount
of capital needed and can employ it efficiently. The fixed nature of its costs,
the specialization in its use, and the technical character of its operations make
its economic success dependent upon large volume transportation of a relatively uniform product. These requirements have been met through combining its operations with those of a large oil refining plant. This economic
union of manufacturing and transportation processes in one business unit
has put the small independent refiner at a tremendous disadvantage in placing
his product in the principal markets. By employing profits resulting from
low cost pipe line operations to recoup losses resulting from marketing operations, the integrated oil companies have been able to reduce competition in
the marketing area where no similar advantage in efficiency over rival
marketing firms exists.
Federal regulation has sought to divert the pipe lines from their exclusive
employment by the integrated oil companies to the use of independent shippers of petroleum by requiring them to be operated as common carriers. So
far, regulation has not brought this transformation about. Jurisdiction necessary to place regulation of the pipe lines into full operation has not been
granted by the Supreme Court. The Interstate Commerce Commission has
not yet been accorded complete common carrier jurisdiction over gasoline
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pipe lines that carry gasoline solely-for the refiner-owner to distant markets.
An interstate crude oil pipe line running to a refinery of the shipper-owner
and carrying only oil that has been pumped from his wells has been excluded
specifically from the jurisdiction of the Commission. In order to carry out
the intent of Congress to make the interstate pipe lines available to independent companies the Interstate Commerce Commission should be given
complete jurisdiction over all interstate pipe lines. A clear cut solution of
this problem may require Congressional action.
Where the Commission has regulated the pipe lines of integrated companies, the rates were set at a level to leave the integrated companies a considerable advantage over the independent companies. The Commission has a
mandate from Congress "to regulate to the end of developing, coordinating,
and preserving a national transportation system," 20 3 so it is not apt to reduce
rates further for fear of discouraging development of pipe lines. Furthermore, the independent companies are at a disadvantage in using these pipe
lines of the integrated companies because they must make costly investment
in connections with the pipe lines and in storage facilities necessary to meet
minimum tender requirements allowed to the pipe lines by the Commission.
Innovations in railroading might enable freight rates to be lowered on a basis
of multiple car shipments and afford relief to the independent shippers.
However, unless the cost of carrying petroleum in trainload shipments can
be found to be much lower than the present costs of transporting these
quantities of oil in carload shipments, rail rates cannot be lowered to the
level of pipe line rates, since existing law requires that the rates established
20 4
be adequate from the standpoint of costs.
A divorcement of the pipe lines from ownership by the large refining companies might result in more widespread competition. However, the large
integrated refiners still would be able to use these lines more favorably than
the small independent refiners. Divorcement under the Elkins Act is of
doubtful legality. Direct action by Congress would seem to be required, if
this objective is desired. But would new pipe line companies separated from
the oil companies assume the risk of developing new lines as have the oil
companies? Would these companies provide a pipe line system adequate to
meet the needs of the national economy and the national defense? In event
of another war, would the Federal government be required to build pipe
line facilities on a much greater scale than it did in World War II?
899, 49 U. S. C. preamble preceding § 1 (1940).
Petroleum Rail Shippers' Association v. Alton & Southern R.R., 243 I. C. C. 589,

20354 STAT.
204

639 (1941).
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The Federal government could take over the job of supplying new pipe
line facilities. It could assume the necessary risk and provide the nation
with adequate facilities in event of war. Also, if these lines were operated by
the government on a cost basis, small independent shippers could be given
an effective outlet for their petroleum. Government operation of the "Big
Inch" and "Little Big Inch" lines 2° 5 could serve to bring about greater com205In a report to Congress, January 4, 1946, the Surplus Property Administrator

recommended that the "Big Inch" and "Little Big Inch" lines be disposed of to private
interests to be operated as true common carriers of petroleum at rates based on the
cost of iervice plus a reasonable return on investment. However, "if all efforts to
dispose of the lines to private industry should fail," government operations on a full cost
basis should be considered. In order that the lines be available for service of the armed
forces in event of another national emergency, it was recommended that a recapture
clause be included in a sales contract with a private purchaser. (The Army-Navy
Petroleum Board found that the government owned pipe lines were vitally necessary in
case of another war.) Government Owned Pipe Lines, Report of the Surplus Property
Administration (Jan. 4, 1946), 27-28.
The Administrator also stated that the two lines could be operated competitively, in
carrying petroleum to the Eastern seaboard market, with other means of transportation.
It was estimated that -the "Big Inch" could carry oil to the East Coast at a cost of
17.1 cents per barrel when operated at full capacity, as compared to a cost of 32.6 cents
per barrel for transportation by tanker. When operated at two-thirds capacity, the pipe
line cost would be 21.8 cents. A conversion of the line from an electrically operated
pumping system to a Diesel operated system would result in a one cent saving per
barrel at full capacity operation. Id. at 14.
The "Little Big Inch" is in a less favorable cost position. For full capacity operation,
the estimated cost is 21.7 cents per barrel as compared to tanker cost of 20.2 cents per
barrel. For two-thirds capacity operation, the estimated cost is 28.2 cents. If used at
capacity and converted to Diesel power, "it might be competitive" on the basis of cost.
Id. at 15.
The Administrator pointed out that the lines certainly would be competitive at the
prevailing rates of private pipe lines and tankers. "In addition, they would act as
stabilizers of excessive rates by other means of transport, thereby permanently reducing
the cost of distribution to shippers who do not possess their own facilities." Id. at 16.
Government operation of these two pipe lines on a cost basis should be a powerful
force in causing a lowering of pipe line rates and in promoting competition in the oil
industry. Cf. 2 LYON, ABRAMSON, and ASSOCIATEs, GOVERNMENT AND EcoNomic LIFE
(1940) 743 as to the effect of T.V.A. on rates.
After the two pipe lines were advertised for sale and the bidding opened on June 8,
1946, sixteen bids were submitted. Eleven of the bids were for using the lines in petroleum transport and the other five were for using them in natural gas transmission.
None of the bids was made by a major oil company. On Nov. 19, War Assets Administrator Littlejohn announced that he had rejected all sixteen bids. See Hassett, Those
Troublesome "Inch" Pipe Lines (Dec. 1946) 38 PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY 796
and Two Pipe Lines for Sale (Jan. 1945) 31 FORTUNE 125, 142 for a discussion of the
disposal question.
The two pipe lines were converted to natural gas during the coal strike crisis in
November, 1946, and they were leased to the Tennessee Gas and Transmission Co. for
a period of 120 days. From December 1, 1946, the company operated them under the
direction of the Department of Interior. Hassett, loc. cit. sitpra at 207.
Inasmuch as these pipe lines have been converted to carrying natural gas, the peril
of a coal strike is apt to continue, and the public is apt to demand a continuation of
natural gas service after having experienced its advantages over coal. There is little
likelihood that the competitive problems of the petroleum industry will find a solution
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petition in the Eastern and Midwestern markets among the petroleum shippers of the Southwest.
In similar situations, the Federal government has resorted to regulation
according to the public utility approach. This approach assumes a tendency
to monopoly and imposes restrictions to prevent the injurious exercise of
monopoly power. The success of this type of regulation as applied to other
industries in the past is debatable. 20 6 Its effectiveness depends to a high
degree upon the agency entrusted .with the duties of regulation. While the
monopolistic nature of the functions of transportation and manufacturing
in the petroleum industry points to their regulation along public utility lines,
the competitive nature of the functions of, extraction and marketing seems
to preclude this same approach to regulating the whole oil industry. A dismemberment of the oil companies to bring about a separation of monopolistic
and competitive functions may be required to make possible the operation of
different forms of public control of the whole petroleum industry.
Any governmental policy taken towards the petroleum pipe line should
recognize the economic advantages of integrating it with the process of refining oil, the tendency to monopoly resulting from the size of the capital
investment and its great superiority over other transportation means, the
necessity of permitting more widespread public participation in the economic
gains resulting from its employment, and the importance of its efficient utilization and continued development to the economic prosperity and military
defense of the nation.
in the near future by government operation of the "Big Inch" and "Little Big Inch"
pipe
206lines.

Professor H. M. Gray believes that the public utility concept has failed "to protect
consumers from the aggressions of monopolists" and "has ended as a device to protect
property." See Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept (1942) READINGS IN
THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 294. Professor B. V. Lewis believes that "the
record of public utility regulation generally since 1907 is neither impressive, nor yet
too disheartening." See 2 LYON, ABRASON, and ASSOCIATES, GOVERNMENT AND Eco-

NomIc LnE (1940) 744.

